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ABSTRACT 
  This Article posits that the essential role of securities regulation is 
to create a competitive market for sophisticated professional investors 
and analysts (information traders). The Article advances two related 
theses—one descriptive and the other normative. Descriptively, the 
Article demonstrates that securities regulation is specifically designed 
to facilitate and protect the work of information traders. Securities 
regulation may be divided into three broad categories: (i) disclosure 
duties; (ii) restrictions on fraud and manipulation; and (iii) 
restrictions on insider trading—each of which contributes to the 
creation of a vibrant market for information traders. Disclosure duties 
reduce information traders’ costs of searching and gathering 
information. Restrictions on fraud and manipulation lower 
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information traders’ cost of verifying the credibility of information, 
and thus enhance information traders’ ability to make accurate 
predictions. Finally, restrictions on insider trading protect information 
traders from competition from insiders that would undermine 
information traders’ ability to recoup their investment in information. 
Normatively, the Article shows that information traders can best 
underwrite efficient and liquid capital markets, and, hence, it is this 
group that securities regulation should strive to protect. Our account 
has important implications for several policy debates. First, our 
account supports the system of mandatory disclosure. We show that, 
although market forces may provide management with an adequate 
incentive to disclose at the initial public offering (IPO) stage, they 
cannot be relied on to effect optimal disclosure thereafter. Second, our 
analysis categorically rejects calls to limit disclosure duties to hard 
information and self-dealing by management. Third, our analysis 
supports the use of the fraud-on-the-market presumption in all fraud 
cases even when markets are inefficient. Fourth, our analysis suggests 
that in cases involving corporate misstatements, the appropriate 
standard of care should, in principle, be negligence, not fraud. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Any serious examination of the role and function of securities 
regulation must sidestep the widespread, yet misguided, belief that 
securities regulation aims at protecting the common investor.1 
Securities regulation is not a consumer protection law. Rather, 
scholarly analysis of securities regulation must proceed on the 
assumption that the ultimate goal of securities regulation is to attain 
efficient financial markets and thereby improve the allocation of 
resources in the economy.2 Accepting this assumption, however, 
raises an important question: how precisely does securities regulation 
promote market efficiency? Surprisingly, this pivotal question has 
never been fully answered.3 This Article seeks to redress this critical 
omission by providing a unifying general theory that explicates and 
clarifies the essential role of securities regulation.4 
 
 1. For a long time, courts focused on protecting the ordinary or small investor. See, e.g., 
Schlesinger Inv. P’ship v. Fluor Corp., 671 F.2d 739, 743 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The Williams Act was 
meant to protect the ordinary investor.”); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. 
Supp. 544, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (“[P]rospectuses should be intelligible to the average small 
investor.”). Similarly, Congress also focused on ordinary investor protection for many years. 
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 73–85, pt. 1 (1933) (legislative history of Securities Acts) (“The purpose 
of the legislation . . . is to protect the public with the least possible interference to honest 
business.”); H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, pt. 2, at 5 (1934) (“As a complex society so diffuses . . . the 
financial interests of the ordinary citizen that he . . . cannot personally watch the managers of all 
his interests . . . it becomes a condition of the very stability of that society that its rules of law . . . 
protect that ordinary citizen’s dependent position.”). Some commentators criticize this focus on 
the ordinary investor without offering a coherent alternative. See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, On 
“Protecting the Ordinary Investor,” 63 WASH. L. REV. 881, 882–83 (1988) (criticizing the 
monolithic view of investors’ protection and describing varying levels of protection needed by 
different groups of investors). 
 2. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, 
and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 802 (1985) (“[T]he law should select rules 
promoting the efficiency of financial markets relative to the optimal information set.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Robert M. Bushman, Joseph D. Piotoski & Abbie J. Smith, What Determines 
Corporate Transparency?, 42 J. ACCT. RES. 207, 208 (2004) (noting that, although information 
costs play a central role in financial theories concerning economic development and efficiency, 
“little research considers how and why information systems, per se, vary around the world”). 
 4. It should be noted that our analysis focuses exclusively on publicly traded securities on 
stock exchanges. We do not address the effect of securities regulation on transactions outside of 
stock exchanges or on transactions involving nonfungible assets. 
01__GOSHEN_PARCHOMOVSKY.DOC 8/22/2006  8:47 AM 
714 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:711 
The main thesis of this Article posits that the role of securities 
regulation is to create and promote a competitive market for 
information traders. Drawing on this thesis, we construct a complete 
account of the mechanisms through which securities regulation 
promotes efficient financial markets and offer a coherent legal 
framework for analyzing securities regulation policy. Although other 
scholars who explored specific issues in securities regulation touched 
upon our main thesis, none, to date, has proceeded to offer a general 
theory that explains securities regulation as a whole.5 
The two main determinants of market efficiency are share price 
accuracy and financial liquidity.6 More accurate share prices and more 
liquid trading enhance the efficiency of financial markets.7 Given the 
importance of incorporating information into prices and providing 
liquidity in trading, the question for policymakers is: who should be 
entrusted with performing these tasks? There are several groups of 
market participants among whom policymakers can choose. The first 
consists of insiders, who possess nonpublic information, and have the 
ability to process and analyze general market and firm-specific 
information. The second group is information traders, who specialize 
in gathering and analyzing general market and firm-specific 
information. The third group is liquidity traders, who buy and hold a 
portfolio of stocks based on consumption/saving considerations 
independently of general market or firm-specific information. The 
final group is noise traders, who act irrationally, falsely believing that 
they possess some valuable informational advantage or superior 
 
 5. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 728–29 (1984) (focusing on sell-side analysts while 
justifying mandatory disclosure); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, 
Markets, and “Negative” Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1249–51 (2001) 
(focusing on analysts while justifying the restriction on insider trading); Paul Mahoney, 
Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 623–24 
(1992) (focusing on informed traders while criticizing the fraud-on-the-market theory). 
 6. See Francis A. Longstaff, Optimal Portfolio Choice and the Valuation of Illiquid 
Securities, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 407, 407–08 (2001) (noting the importance of liquidity); Jonathan 
R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National Market System, 
1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 325–26 (1985) (explaining the importance of liquidity); cf. Ken 
Nyholm, Estimating the Probability of Informed Trading, 25 J. FIN. RES. 485, 504 (2002) 
(“[L]ow-volume stocks are found to be much slower than high-volume stocks in adapting quotes 
to new full-information levels.”). See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A 
Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) (emphasizing the importance of 
share price accuracy). 
 7. See Ronald Gilson & Reinier R. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 
VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) 
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trading skills.8 In light of the inability of noise traders to promote 
market efficiency and the indifference of liquidity traders to accurate 
pricing,9 one must narrow the list to two groups: insiders and 
information traders. 
A comparison of the two groups reveals that information traders 
operate in a highly competitive environment, whereas insiders 
operate under quasi-monopolistic conditions. In addition, information 
traders enjoy economies of scale and scope in gathering and analyzing 
general market and firm-specific information; generate positive 
externalities for the information market; cannot manipulate business 
decisions or take advantage of timing when using firm-specific 
information; and reduce corporate governance agency costs. For all 
these reasons, the policy behind securities regulation is to protect the 
interests of information traders over those of insiders (and other 
market participants). 
This Article agrees with this policy and advances two related 
policy justifications to support it—one descriptive and the other 
normative. Descriptively, this Article contends that securities 
regulation is specifically designed to facilitate and protect the work of 
information traders. Furthermore, it shows that information traders 
are the only group that benefits from securities regulation. The 
remaining groups—liquidity traders, noise traders and insiders—
either cannot or do not need to avail themselves of the benefits that 
securities regulation provides. For liquidity traders and noise traders, 
securities regulation is of little practical relevance. Insiders, on the 
other hand, are made worse off by securities regulation. The only 
group positively affected is the information traders. 
Normatively, this Article argues that information traders are the 
group that can best underwrite efficient and liquid capital markets, 
and, hence, it is this group securities regulation should strive to 
protect. By protecting information traders, securities regulation 
enhances efficiency and liquidity in financial markets. This protection, 
in turn, benefits other types of investors by reducing transaction costs 
and increasing liquidity. Furthermore, by protecting information 
traders, securities regulation represents the highest form of market 
integrity, which ensures accurate pricing and superior liquidity to all 
 
 8. Another group—market makers—is added later in the Article to simplify the model. 
See infra Part I.B. 
 9. For detailed discussion, see infra Part I. 
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investors.10 In this way, securities regulation improves the allocation 
of resources in the economy.11 
The law of securities regulation may be divided into three broad 
categories: disclosure duties, restrictions on fraud and manipulation, 
and restrictions on insider trading.12 Each category facilitates the 
activities of information traders in a distinct way. Disclosure duties 
reduce their information gathering costs.13 Restrictions on fraud and 
manipulation simultaneously lower information traders’ cost of 
verifying the credibility of information, and improve their ability to 
make accurate predictions.14 Finally, restrictions on insider trading 
protect information traders from competition from insiders that 
would undercut the ability of information traders to recoup their 
investment in information, driving information traders out of the 
market.15 Thus, the aggregate effect of securities regulation is to 
create and secure a competitive market for information traders. 
Moreover, a competitive market for information traders reduces 
management agency costs. In cases of conflict of interest between 
management and shareholders, management is likely to abuse its 
 
 10. See Marcel Kahan, Securities Regulations and the Social Costs of Inaccurate Stock 
Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 988 (1992). 
 11. See, e.g., John F. Barry III, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 
U. PA. L. REV. 1307, 1316 (1981) (citing the goal of capital markets as “a pareto optimal 
resource allocation”); Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages under 
the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 341 (1979) (“The market will thus function 
efficiently to allocate savings to enterprises which are more profitable and divert them from 
enterprises which are less profitable.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions 
and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13–15 (1982); Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, 
Share Price Accuracy and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 
367–68 (2003) (finding that more accurate share prices enhance the performance of the real 
economy); Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda, 35 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 688, 720–21 (1997) (examining the direct correlation between financial 
development and economic growth). 
 12. It is customary to group insider trading under “fraud and manipulation.” However, for 
reasons explained next in the text, we differentiate between insider trading and other forms of 
fraud relating to distorted information and trading. 
 13. See generally Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate 
Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 405 (2001) (conducting empirical research regarding the relationship between 
disclosure and information costs in capital markets settings). 
 14. See infra Part III.C. 
 15. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 5, at 1258 (“In the absence of pre-emptive 
competition from insiders, analysts will enter the market.”). 
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power to further its interests at the expense of those of shareholders.16 
The management agency cost might take the form of a breach of the 
duty of loyalty (e.g., self-dealing), or a breach of the duty of care (e.g., 
inefficient investments).17 Disclosure duties help reveal management 
actions. Although breaches of the duty of loyalty attract greater 
media attention,18 breaches of the duty of care are much more 
prevalent and their social cost is much higher.19 Although courts can 
discern fraud or illegal transfers, they are ill-equipped to evaluate the 
quality of business decisions.20 As a result, judicial oversight can 
curtail breaches of the duty of loyalty but not breaches of the duty of 
care. In fact, in reviewing business decisions, courts employ the 
business judgment rule, which calls for minimal intervention.21 Thus, 
 
 16. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 354–55 (1976) 
(describing the agency costs of outside vs. inside equity). 
 17. See, e.g., Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (finding 
directors not liable for “losses suffered by their corporations by reason of their gross inattention 
to the common law duty of actively supervising and managing the corporate affairs”); Principles 
of Corporate Governance § 4.01 (outlining the duty of care of directors and officers and 
establishing the business judgment rule); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984); STEPHEN M. 
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 286–304 (2002). 
 18. See, e.g., Mary Flood, Court denies request for Enron document release, CHRON.COM, 
Oct. 1, 2003, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/enron/2129992.html (reporting on the 
media’s effort to get transcripts of the Enron criminal trial). 
 19. See Michael C. Jensen, The Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323–24 (1986) (describing the efficiency cost in free cash 
flow and how debt motivates organizational efficiency); Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public 
Corporation, 67 HARV. BUS. REV., 61, 64 (1989) (explaining that, in industries of slow long-term 
grown, management is pressured to waste resources). 
 20. Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 243, 270–71 (2002). 
 21. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264–65 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(affirming preliminary injunction and holding that the business judgment rule does not apply to 
defendant’s action due to a prima facie showing of self-interest); Gearhart Indus. Inc. v. Smith 
Int’l Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 721 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing rule barring liability of corporate directors for 
“mistakes of business judgment that damage corporate interests”); Berwald v. Mission Dev. Co., 
185 A.2d 480, 482–83 (Del. 1962) (affirming summary judgment for corporation, thus denying 
minority shareholder-plaintiffs’ motion for liquidation and distribution of assets); Hunter v. 
Roberts, Throp & Co., 47 N.W. 131, 134 (Mich. 1890) (noting that a court should “ponder well” 
before compelling payment of a dividend where “each individual director testifies that the 
corporation cannot pay a dividend without serious injury to the business of the corporation”); 
Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810 (Sup. Ct. 1976), aff’d 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. 
Div. 1976) (“[T]he question of whether or not a dividend is to be declared or a distribution of 
some kind should be made is exclusively a matter of business judgment for the board of 
directors.”); In re Spering, 71 Pa. 11, 21 (1872) (finding “no judgment or decree which has held 
directors to account except when they have themselves been personally guilty of some fraud on 
the corporation, or have known and connived at some fraud in others, or where such fraud 
might have been prevented had they given ordinary attention to their duties”). 
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the task of curbing breaches of the duty of care is largely left to the 
market and to social norms.22 Intense coverage by analysts—a 
subgroup of information traders—is the most effective antidote to 
management agency costs.23 In contrast to judges, analysts are capable 
of evaluating the quality of managements’ business decisions and 
reflect their opinions in stock prices. 
Our account of the role of securities regulation also sheds new 
light on several ongoing policy debates concerning the role and 
content of securities regulation. First, our account supports a system 
of mandatory disclosure.24 We show that although market forces may 
provide management with an adequate incentive to disclose at the 
initial public offering (IPO) stage, they cannot be relied on to effect 
optimal disclosure thereafter. Whereas at the IPO stage there exists 
asymmetric information between the seller (the corporation and its 
management) and the buyers (potential shareholders), in the 
secondary market, there is no asymmetric information between 
sellers (actual shareholders) and buyers (potential shareholders); all 
nonpublic information lies with management. Thus, because 
information traders compete amidst equally uninformed sellers and 
buyers, they cannot induce optimal disclosure from corporations by 
“assuming the worst” about corporations that provide suboptimal 
disclosure. Because the interest of management diverges from that of 
shareholders, information traders cannot discipline “reticent” 
management by lowering share prices. Thus, optimal disclosure must 
be mandated. 
Second, our analysis categorically rejects the calls to limit 
disclosure duties to hard information25 and self-dealing by 
management.26 These calls are predicated on the view that securities 
regulation should only be concerned with minimizing agency costs, 
 
 22. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, 
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1623–24 (2001) (describing how 
the business judgment rule allows nonlegally enforceable rules and standards such as the duty of 
care to properly govern and reduce third-party adjudication). 
 23. See, e.g., John A. Doukas et al., Security Analysis, Agency Costs, and Company 
Characteristics, 56 FIN. ANALYSTS. J. 54, 61 (2000) (supplying empirical evidence showing that 
security analysis acts as a monitor to reduce the agency costs associated with separation of 
ownership and control). 
 24. See infra Part III.A. 
 25. Hard information refers to facts that are easy to verify, such as past information, while 
soft information refers to facts that are hard to verify, such as future plans and projections. 
 26. See infra Part II.E. 
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not with achieving accurate pricing. It seems, however, that this 
proposal assumes only one type of management agency cost: breaches 
of the duty of loyalty. Once breaches of the duty of care are added to 
the analysis, it becomes evident that narrowing disclosure duties 
would in fact hamper the ability of information traders to minimize 
total management agency costs. 
Third, our analysis supports the use of the fraud-on-the-market 
(FOTM) presumption even when markets are inefficient.27 Several 
scholars argue that the finding of certain behavioral economics 
studies, which show that markets are inefficient, eliminates the 
theoretical justification for the fraud-on-the-market presumption.28 
Our model, however, shows that the justification for using the fraud-
on-the-market theory is even stronger when markets are inefficient. 
Information traders are the agents who render markets efficient. 
Therefore, when markets are inefficient, it is even more crucial to aid 
and protect information traders. 
Fourth, our analysis similarly rejects the argument that courts 
should abolish the fraud-on-the-market presumption when markets 
are efficient, and reinstate, in its stead, common law reliance.29 Critics 
of the fraud-on-the-market presumption have claimed that it 
overdeters voluntary disclosure by management because it forces 
corporations to compensate not only information traders who relied 
on misstatements, but also liquidity traders who were not harmed.30 
We show that once the full scope of the harm from misstatements is 
taken into consideration, no overdeterrence results. Misstatements 
create several types of harms. They increase verification costs for 
information traders, raise liquidity costs for liquidity traders, and 
aggravate agency costs for all corporations. The fraud-on-the-market 
presumption ensures compensation that reflects all these harms. In 
fact, we show that given that management is the cheapest cost avoider 
of the harm resulting from misstatements, the appropriate standard of 
care should, in principle, be negligence, not fraud. 
 
 27. See infra notes 223–26 and accompanying text. 
 28. Paul A. Ferrillo et al., The “Less Than” Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis: Requiring 
More Proof From Plaintiffs in Fraud-On-The-Market Cases, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 107–16 
(2004); see also infra notes 211–14 and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra notes 227–28 and accompanying text. 
 30. See Mahoney, supra note 5, at 656 (“The reliance filter is an appropriate one because it 
removes that subset of plaintiffs whose ex ante behavior will be altered least by the denial of 
recovery—namely, those traders who either ignore or independently verify, and therefore do 
not rely on misstatements.”). 
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Structurally, this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explores 
the mechanisms by which financial markets achieve efficiency and 
liquidity. It pays special attention to the role of information traders in 
improving financial markets and explains why securities regulation 
should favor information traders over other market participants and 
ensure the development of a vibrant market for information traders. 
Part II highlights the ways in which securities regulation law creates 
and supports a market for information traders. Part III discusses the 
normative implications of our analysis. We explain the ramifications 
of our analysis for the debate on mandatory disclosure and provide a 
new justification for the fraud-on-the-market presumption. 
I.  THE MARKET MECHANISM 
Efficient markets are characterized by accurate pricing and high 
liquidity.31 Accurate pricing is essential for achieving efficient 
allocation of resources in the economy.32 Accurate pricing is also 
important to the market for corporate control, for monitoring and 
controlling the management agency problem, and for the allocation of 
resources through initial public offerings and secondary offerings.33 
Liquid markets benefit the economy by reducing the cost of 
transacting and the risk associated with investments.34 Markets are 
liquid when traders can buy or sell large quantities, immediately, 
without causing a substantial price effect. This liquidity is a function 
of time, price and quantity.35 In the remainder of this Part, we present 
a market model that explains the processes by which markets attain 
efficiency and liquidity. 
 
 31. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 554. 
 32. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 33. For a detailed analysis of the effects of efficient pricing, see generally Kahan, supra 
note 10. 
 34. See id. at 1019–22 (describing the inaccuracies and social costs resulting from reduced 
liquidity). See generally Yakov Amihud, Illiquidity and Stock Returns: Cross-Section and Time 
Series Effects, 5 J. FIN. MARKETS 31 (2002) (examining the relationship between stock returns 
and stock liquidity). For discussion on higher transacting costs in the form of larger bid-ask 
spreads, see Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82 Q.J. ECON. 33, 35–36 (1968) (“On the 
NYSE two elements comprise almost all of transaction cost—brokerage fees and ask-bid 
spreads.”) and Lawrence R. Glosten & Lawrence E. Harris, Estimating the Components of the 
Bid/Ask Spread, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 138, 141 (1988) (presenting a model analyzing transitory 
and adverse selection components of the bid-ask spread). 
 35. Laurie S. Hodrick & Pamela C. Moulton, Liquidity: Considerations of a Portfolio 
Manager 1–2 (Dec. 16, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=449540. 
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A. Efficiency and Liquidity in Financial Markets 
1. Incorporating Information into Prices.  In efficient markets, 
information about the value of firms is incorporated quickly and 
accurately into stock prices.36 This process involves three different 
tasks: information production; accuracy verification; and finally, 
pricing the information. Information Production involves searching 
for currently unknown information that affects prices. Accuracy 
verification involves actions necessary to confirm the reliability of the 
information source and the credibility of the information. Pricing 
information requires analyzing the information to determine its value, 
and then trading based on discrepancies between price and value. 
Information production involves two different types of 
information: firm-specific information and general market 
information. Firm-specific information includes a firm’s attributes 
such as management quality, business plans and past record, financial 
position, and research and development potential. General market 
information includes information about the general conditions in 
which the firm functions, such as the prospect of competitors, the 
industry as a whole, and the local and global economy. 
Verification of the accuracy of information involves two kinds of 
information: explicit and implicit information. Explicit information 
includes all types of direct firm-specific and general market 
information, such as financial reports, conference calls and news. 
Implicit information comprises all activities that indirectly convey 
information, such as price movements, trading volume, trader identity 
and order flows. 
Pricing information consists of two distinct activities: analyzing 
information and trading. Analyzing information requires analyzing 
both firm-specific and general market information. Firm-specific 
information cannot be accurately priced in isolation because one 
cannot evaluate the future prospects of a corporation without 
knowledge about the estimated course of the local and global 
economies. Trading, the act by which information is transmitted to 
the market, can take one of two forms: direct trading, or indirect 
trading through recommendations and advice to others who trade. 
 
 36. For a comprehensive description of the processes by which markets attain efficiency, 
see generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 7. 
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2. Providing Liquidity in Trading.  For markets to be liquid 
there must exist sufficient trading to enable most buyers and sellers to 
consummate transactions expeditiously. Liquidity is achieved on 
account of three principal reasons: portfolio adjustments, 
consumption/investment adjustments, and divergence of opinions.37 
Portfolio adjustments provide liquidity when managers change 
portfolio composition to conform with investors’ predetermined risk 
and return levels. Consumption/investment adjustments create 
liquidity by effecting shifts of funds from investment to consumption 
and vice versa. Divergence of opinions among market players creates 
liquidity by prompting transactions between market players with 
different valuations of the same security.38 
B. The Market Players 
We model the capital market as consisting of five main groups: 
insiders, information traders, liquidity traders, noise traders, and 
market makers. Insiders have access to inside information due to their 
proximity to the firm; they also have the knowledge and ability to 
price and evaluate this information. Insiders can produce and price 
general market information, as well as inside information. Insiders’ 
narrow focus on their own corporation, however, prevents them from 
exploiting economies of scale and scope in gathering, evaluating and 
pricing general market information.39 Moreover, due to their 
proximity to the firm, insiders cannot objectively assess the value of 
their own business decisions.40 
 
 37. Hans R. Stoll, Alternative Views of Market Making, in MARKET MAKING AND THE 
CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 67, 67–68 (Yakov Amihud et al. eds., 
1985) (“[T]rading arises . . . either because the investor has information that leads him to believe 
the fundamental price of the security has changed or because he desires liquidity to meet 
consumption or savings objectives or otherwise wishes to rebalance his portfolio.”). 
 38. Such transactions are due in part to irrational trading inspired by fads and rumors or 
baseless information. In these cases, the traders (falsely) believe that they possess better 
valuations of the traded stocks than their counterparts. 
 39. In addition, insiders suffer difficulties in processing information. See H. Nejat Seyhun, 
The Information Content of Aggregate Insider Trading, 61 J. BUS. 1, 2–3 (1988) (indicating that 
insiders cannot always distinguish between the effects of firm-specific and economy-wide 
factors). 
 40. See Donald Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why 
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Commit Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 101, 157 n.196 (1997); Jonathan R. Macey & Arnoud W.A. Boot, Monitoring Corporate 
Performance: The Role of Objectivity, Proximity and Adaptability in Corporate Governance, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 356, 357 (2004) (discussing the corporate management monitoring tradeoff 
between objectivity and proximity). 
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Information traders, the second group, lack access to inside 
information, but are willing and able to devote resources to gathering 
and analyzing information as a basis for their investment decisions. 
Information traders comprise two subgroups: sophisticated 
professional investors and analysts. Sophisticated professional 
investors comprise a wide range of institutional investors, money 
managers, and other market professional players, all of whom rely, to 
varying degrees, on some sort of financial or business analytical 
products as a basis for their investment decisions. Analysts include 
three subgroups: Sell-side analysts, buy-side analysts, and 
independent analysts.41 Sell-side analysts are employed by investment 
banks to follow and evaluate certain stocks. Sell-side analysts disclose 
their analytical work to the market for free, and do not attempt to 
profit by trading on their valuations. This coverage of sell-side 
analysts is essentially a service to the clients of the investment bank. 
The coverage of sell-side analysts aims at attracting investors to the 
covered stocks and firms to the investment bank. Accordingly, sell-
side analysts indirectly support the investment banking divisions that 
underwrite IPOs. Buy-side analysts are employed by large 
institutional investors, such as mutual funds, hedge funds and pension 
funds, to manage investment portfolios. These analysts keep their 
analytical products confidential and profit through trading based on 
discrepancies between their valuation and the market price. In 
performing their work, buy-side analysts use the analytical products 
of the sell-side analysts as one source of information among the other 
sources they use. Independent analysts are not associated with an 
investment bank and produce analytical products which they sell to 
their clients through some method of subscription to their service. We 
group the whole variety of sophisticated professional investors and 
the three types of analysts under the category of “information 
traders.” 
Like insiders, information traders have the ability and knowledge 
to collect, evaluate and price firm-specific and general market 
information. But unlike insiders, information traders can exploit 
economies of scale and scope when evaluating and pricing 
information because of their broader focus on industries and markets. 
Knowledge gained with respect to one corporation in a particular 
 
 41. See John L. Orcutt, Investor Skepticism v. Investor Confidence: Why the New Research 
Analyst Reform Will Harm Investors, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 6–10 (2002) (providing an 
overview of categories of research analysts). 
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industry can often be used with respect to another, and knowledge 
pertaining to the economy as a whole is useful in analyzing all 
corporations.42 
The third group of market players in capital markets, liquidity 
traders, does not collect and evaluate information; rather, investment 
by this group reflects the allocation of resources between savings and 
consumption.43 Unwilling to devote resources to constant gathering 
and analysis of new information, rational utility traders follow a 
strategy of buying and holding a portfolio of stocks (usually buying 
some index of stocks).44 
Noise traders, the fourth group, act irrationally and follow 
differing methods of investment either as individuals or as a group.45 
Noise traders often believe that they are in possession of valuable 
information, and invest as if they are information traders. Market 
participants cannot separate noise traders from true information 
traders, a task complicated by the wide spectrum of noise trading 
activity. At the lowest level, there exist irrational traders, who follow 
fads, rumors, and investment strategies that bear no economic 
rationale, such as chasing random price movements in day trading. At 
the highest level, one finds stock pickers, who collect and evaluate 
information similarly to information traders and attempt to make 
economically rational and informed investment decisions. However, 
they are less efficient than information traders in performing these 
 
 42. Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure 
Regulation and Externalities, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 479, 480 (2000); Brian Bushee & Christian 
Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure Regulation: Evidence from the OTC Bulletin 
Board, 39 J. ACCT. & ECON. 233, 237 (2005). 
 43. Another group that falls under this category is arbitragers, who search for similar assets 
that are trading for different prices and trade to capture the difference. Arbitragers only care 
about the relative prices of similar assets. Arbitrage trade is triggered by discrepancies between 
the prices of the two assets, and the true value of either asset is irrelevant. Because the 
information about the true value of the corporation is irrelevant for this group, we label them as 
liquidity traders. 
 44. See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 
NW. U. L. REV. 1449, 1453 (1986) (demonstrating that, neglecting the impact of managerial 
salary and motivation, shareholders with diversified portfolios who follow a “buy and hold” 
strategy are “indifferent about whether the insiders of the firms in which they own shares are 
banned from trading”). 
 45. On noise traders in capital markets, see generally J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise 
Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703 (1990) (modeling an asset market in 
which the beliefs of noise traders affect prices and earn higher expected returns than those of 
rational traders, and concluding that the risk produced by noise traders’ unpredictable opinions 
reduces the attractiveness of arbitrage). 
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tasks. As a result, stock pickers are “slower” at gathering and 
analyzing all relevant information and the accuracy of their 
evaluations is inferior to that of information traders. Indeed, stock 
pickers mostly rely on old information that is already reflected in 
price, such as published analytical products of sell-side analysts and 
information from financial websites, television channels, newspapers, 
and magazines.46 By avoiding a buy and hold strategy, stock pickers 
both lose more frequently to informed traders and incur wasteful 
transaction costs. Thus, although stock pickers seem to be rational in 
responding to economically relevant information, they are not. 
Accordingly, we consider them noise traders.47 
Finally, market makers are professionals who facilitate trading 
and maintain a market for securities by offering to buy or sell 
securities on a regular basis. They post a buying offer (bid price) and 
a selling offer (ask price), and serve as the counter party for investors 
who want to trade. Market makers are well informed about the 
demand and supply of a security because they use this information to 
set the bid and ask prices (widely known as the bid-ask spread).48 But 
they are not as well informed as information traders regarding firm-
specific information because they do not invest as much time and 
effort in collecting and analyzing this information.49 Given that they 
 
 46. See Sok Tae Kim et al., Market Structure, Informed Trading, and Analysts’ 
Recommendations, 32 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 507, 507 (1997) (finding, based on 
empirical research, that any valuable information contained in analysts research is reflected in 
stock prices within five to fifteen minutes of the market opening, and long before the research is 
released publicly). 
 47. The classification we use is functional in the sense that some market players will 
sometime be information traders and sometime noise traders, depending on their actions. 
Indeed, some noise traders will always be noise traders because of intellectual or educational 
deficiencies. However, some information traders will try to beat out noise traders in their own 
game by joining the herd of noise traders and engaging in noise trading. 
 48. See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical 
Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83 (2004) (arguing that 
insider trading forces market makers to increase the bid-ask spread, which in turn imposes the 
social loss of higher transaction costs). For a common definition of the bid-ask spread, see 
NASD—Glossary of Terms—B, http://www.nasd.com/Resources/Glossary/NASDW_010868 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2006) (“[The bid/ask spread is t]he difference between the price at which a 
Market Maker is willing to buy a security (bid), and the price at which the firm is willing to sell 
it (ask). The spread narrows or widens according to the supply and demand for the security 
being traded.”). 
 49. See I.R.C. Hirst, A Model of Market-Making with Imperfect Information, 1 
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 12, 13 (1980) (describing how the “speculator” (information 
trader) has better information than the “jobber” (market maker)). It is claimed, however, that 
while market makers on the New York Stock Exchange do not engage in security analysis, 
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trade largely in response to the buy and sell orders of other market 
players, yet do not rely on independent valuations, market makers are 
neither informed traders nor liquidity traders. 
C. The Pricing Process 
Insiders and information traders detect discrepancies between 
value and price based on the information they possess. They then 
trade to capture the value of their informational advantage.50 When 
they observe an undervaluation, they buy, thereby raising the price; 
conversely, when they spot overvaluation they sell, thereby causing 
the price to drop. Because price changes are always assessed against 
some calculated value, a trade is triggered when the price change is 
not justified by currently known information. Given this investment 
strategy, trading against a party with superior information or based 
on fraudulent information will result in a loss. Moreover, these risks 
cannot be diversified away, as all trades are triggered by either a price 
change or the arrival of new information. 
Liquidity traders, who trade regardless of new information—i.e., 
they sell for liquidity or buy for saving—will trade irrespective of the 
actions of insiders and information traders. If liquidity traders trade 
in the same manner as do insiders or information traders—i.e., they 
buy when information traders or insiders buy, or sell when these 
groups sell—they lose.51 If liquidity traders trade against insiders or 
 
NASDAQ market makers do. Ji Chai Lin et al., External Information Costs and the Adverse 
Selection Problem: A Comparison of NASDAQ and NYSE Stocks, 7 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 
113, 113 (1998). It bears emphasis that we claim neither that market makers are informed nor 
that they are uninformed as a positive description of the world. We use uninformed market 
makers only as a simplifying modeling assumption. From our perspective, however, when 
market makers are informed, we would need a different model in which liquidity traders trade 
directly with informed traders, and thus losses from trading against a more informed trader are 
passed directly to liquidity and noise traders. However, the thrust of our arguments in this 
Article is not altered even if one assumes fully informed market makers. 
 50. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 
55, 75–80 (1965) (describing the process by which market professionals incorporate information 
into prices). 
 51. Assume the price of a stock is $100. Liquidity traders’ trading decisions are 
independent of price. Thus, they will buy and sell at $100 absent insider trading. Now assume 
insiders are buying the stock and the price rises to $110. If liquidity traders are also buying, they 
will lose as they will have to pay more for the stock. Similarly, when insiders are selling the price 
will drop to $90. If liquidity traders are also selling, they will lose as they will have to sell the 
stock for a lower price. 
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information traders, they gain.52 Thus, liquidity traders who follow the 
strategy of buying and holding a portfolio do not lose, on average, to 
either insiders or information traders. When they buy a portfolio they 
lose on some transactions (when they buy together with insiders or 
information traders) and gain on others (when they buy when insiders 
or information traders are selling). Likewise, they lose at times and 
gain at others when they sell the portfolio. On average they earn the 
market return for the period of their holding.53 In short, liquidity 
traders can diversify the risk of trading against more informed 
traders.54 Only traders whose trades are triggered by changes in price 
or changes in information will lose when trading against more 
informed traders.55 
Although liquidity traders can diversify away the risk of 
transacting with more informed traders, they often incur costs 
associated with illiquidity.56 In an illiquid market, when a trader wants 
to sell (or buy) a large quantity of securities she will either have to 
accept a large drop (or increase) in price or a long execution period. 
High liquidity, on the other hand, means fast execution of large 
blocks for a small fee. The main indication of liquidity is the bid-ask 
spread. Every time liquidity traders trade, they bear the cost of the 
 
 52. Assume the price of a stock is $100. Liquidity traders would trade regardless of the 
price. Thus, they will buy and sell at $100 absent insider trading. Now assume insiders are 
buying and the price rises to $110. If liquidity traders are selling, they will gain as they will sell 
the stock for a higher price. Now assume that insiders are selling and the price drops to $90. If 
liquidity traders are buying they will gain as they will have to pay a lower price for the stock. 
 53. In other words, the “fair play” or “market integrity” rationales do not hold with regard 
to these investors: they do not expect equal and timely access to information and indeed they 
are not harmed by not getting it. Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the 
Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporations, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1982) (explaining 
the “fair play” and the “integrity of the securities markets” rationales); Harry Heller, Chiarella, 
SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: “Fairness” versus Economic Theory, 37 BUS. L.J. 517, 555–56 (1982) 
(noting that it is doubtful that investors question the integrity of the market due to known 
differences in information available to investors). 
 54. The risk of asymmetric information can result from the use of illegal inside 
information, from fraud (by those who committed the fraud or by those who discovered it ahead 
of the market), or by legally discovering nonpublic firm-specific or general market information. 
As long as the asymmetric information affects prices randomly it can be diversified. 
 55. William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock 
Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1217, 1235–38 (1981). 
 56. It is clear that informed traders make profits at the expense of someone. In our model, 
although liquidity traders diversify the risk of asymmetric information, they nonetheless 
eventually bear the cost of asymmetric information. The market makers who cannot diversify 
the risk of asymmetric information lose to informed traders and pass these losses to the liquidity 
traders through the bid-ask spread. 
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bid-ask spread much like a tax on each transaction. As a result, 
liquidity traders will either reduce their trading (hold a portfolio for 
longer periods) to avoid paying the spread too many times, or 
discount the market price to compensate for bearing the cost of the 
spread.57 Therefore, a large bid-ask spread reduces liquidity and 
increases the cost of capital for firms. 
Several factors influence the bid-ask spread, including the total 
amount of trading and the level of asymmetric information among the 
traders.58 The amount of trading directly affects liquidity: the more 
traders (informed and uninformed) there are the more liquid is the 
market (and vice versa). Asymmetric information, meanwhile, has an 
indirect effect on liquidity: market makers, who face the 
undiversifiable risk of trading with, and losing to, more informed 
traders, will protect themselves by increasing the bid-ask spread.59 
However, because informed traders will only trade if they stand to 
make a profit that is greater than the cost imposed upon them by the 
bid-ask spread, the real cost of the higher bid-ask spread falls on 
liquidity traders (and noise traders). The effect of asymmetric 
information on liquidity depends on the number of informed traders 
and the value of their information. As the number of informed 
traders increases, and competition among them intensifies, their 
informational advantage lessens.60 And the smaller the value of the 
informational advantage the smaller the bid-ask spread. Thus, 
 
 57. Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Frauds, Markets, and Fraud-on-the-Market: The Tortured 
Transition of Justifiable Reliance from Deceit to Securities Fraud, 49 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 671, 
702–11 (1995). 
 58. See generally Yan He & Chunchi Wu, What Explains the Bid-Ask Spread Decline After 
NASDAQ Reforms?, 12 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 347 (2003) (providing 
evidence that both an decrease in market making costs and an increase in competition 
contributed to a postreform decline in bid-ask spreads in the NASDAQ); Roger D. Huang & 
Hans R. Stoll, The Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: A General Approach, 10 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 995 (1997) (identifying order processing, adverse information, and inventory holding cost 
as the main components of the bid-ask spread); Thomas H. McInish & Bonnie F. Van Ness, An 
Intraday Examination of the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread, 37 FIN. REV. 507 (2002) 
(reviewing studies demonstrating that asymmetric information and order-processing 
components affect the bid-ask spread). 
 59. Michael Welker, Disclosure Policy, Information Asymmetry, and Liquidity in Equity 
Markets, 11 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 801, 802 (1995); see also J.C. Bettis et al., Corporate Policies 
Restricting Trading by Insiders, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 191, 191 (2000) (finding that during periods in 
which corporations prohibit trading by insiders, the bid/ask spread is lower). 
 60. See Birgül Caramanolis-Çötelli et al., Are Investors Sensitive to the Quality and the 
Disclosure of Financial Statements?, 3 EUR. FIN. REV. 131, 133, 148 (1999) (suggesting that 
competition among analysts reduces investors’ adverse selection costs); He & Wu, supra note 
58, at 349 (finding greater competition results with increased frequency of quote updates). 
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liquidity traders are more concerned about liquidity than about 
accurate pricing.61 
Because noise traders are active but irrational, their actions are 
hard to predict. If they act completely randomly they will cancel out 
the effect of each other on prices, and, on average, they will not lose 
to insiders or information traders.62 However, noise traders sometimes 
act as a herd.63 They can be bearish or bullish, as a group, with respect 
to a specific stock, a particular industry, or the market as a whole.64 
Whether they will lose to insiders or information traders depends on 
the time it takes a stock to reach its estimated “value” as calculated 
by insiders or information traders. Suppose insiders and information 
traders believe that a certain stock is overvalued, and thus, sell it. 
Noise traders who buy the stock will lose if they hold the stock until it 
eventually drops. But, in the interim period they can earn a positive 
return if the stock price continues to rise. Indeed, this is why some 
information traders try to profit by joining noise traders and adopting 
noise traders’ strategies. Such informed traders hope to outsmart the 
noise traders and sell the stock before the eventual price drops. As a 
result, information traders who become noise traders intensify, in the 
short run, the effects of noise trading. In the long run, however, noise 
traders will lose, as a group, to insiders or information traders. 
Moreover, due to their high frequency of trading, they will bear the 
cost of liquidity reflected by the bid-ask spread. 
Market prices result from the actions of all five groups. Insiders 
and information traders follow market prices and counter deviations 
from their calculated subjective “value.” Liquidity traders who follow 
the buy-and-hold strategy do not distort prices because their trades 
are mostly random relative to information flow and price movements. 
Noise traders, on account of their irrational investment strategies, 
distort prices. Thus, the accuracy of stock prices depends on the 
ability of insiders or information traders to counter the actions of 
 
 61. Liquidity traders are also concerned with shareholders’ expropriation by managers or 
controlling shareholders. Protection against this risk is the role of corporate law. 
 62. Randomizing a large number of trades has the same protective effect as buying and 
holding a portfolio. However, this strategy involves greater transaction costs. Similarly, 
securities regulation is irrelevant to this strategy. 
 63. For a survey of literature concerning herding in financial markets, see generally De 
Long et al., supra note 45; David Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh, Herd Behaviour and 
Cascading in Capital Markets: A Review and Synthesis, 9 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 25 (2003); Thomas 
Lux, Herd Behaviour, Bubbles and Crashes, 105 ECON. J. 881 (1995). 
 64. See De Long et al., supra note 45, at 704, 715. 
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noise traders and to price newly disclosed information.65 The more 
skilled information traders or insiders can counter price-value 
discrepancies caused by noise traders or by newly disclosed 
information, the more efficient the market is. A perfectly efficient 
equilibrium, however, is unattainable.66 Because prices always deviate 
from value and information traders engage in a continuous alignment 
of prices and value, the fluctuations of price around value represent 
some level of inefficiency. Yet, it is precisely this inefficiency that 
creates an incentive to invest in information and constantly pushes 
the market to become more efficient.67 
From this perspective it is clear that efficient pricing is a matter 
of degree. The larger the deviation between price and value and the 
longer it takes for prices to revert to value, the less efficient the 
market is. Thus, it is not appropriate to classify markets as either 
“efficient” or “inefficient” based on the level of price accuracy. 
Markets can be efficient at times and inefficient at others depending 
on the length of time and the degree of deviation between prices and 
values.68 
It is more appropriate to classify markets based on whether they 
have an effective mechanism for correcting price deviations. A 
market that does not have such a mechanism is inefficient to the 
extent that the pricing is completely random and lacks the ability to 
cause prices to revert to value. We describe such a market as 
“ineffective,” as opposed to “inefficient.” A market that has such a 
mechanism is “efficient” in the sense that it tends to cause prices to 
revert to value. We describe such a market as “effective.” Indeed, in 
such a market there will be periods in which noise traders will 
dominate and information traders or insiders will be unable to 
counter the price distortions caused by noise traders. As a result, in 
such a market, large deviations of prices from value will persist for 
 
 65. We follow the seminal model of Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the 
Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 393–95 (1980). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Philip A. Cusick, Price Effects of Addition or Deletion From the Standard & Poor’s 
500 Index—Evidence of Increasing Market Efficiency, 11 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & 
INSTRUMENTS 349, 349–50 (2002) (supplying evidence that market efficiency increases over 
time). 
 68. The market’s efficiency also varies with regard to different corporations. See, e.g., 
Benjamin C. Ayers & Robert N. Freeman, Evidence That Analyst Following and Institutional 
Ownership Accelerate the Pricing of Future Earnings, 8 REV. ACCT. STUD. 47, 63 (2003) (finding 
evidence that the stock prices of corporations that receive increased analyst coverage reflect 
future earnings earlier than neglected firms). 
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long periods. Obviously, the result will be inaccurate pricing. As long 
as there is a mechanism in place to correct this effect, however, prices 
will eventually revert to value. In other words, a market can be 
effective overall while oscillating between efficient and inefficient 
pricing. Improving the efficiency of the market thus requires 
enhancing the effectiveness of the mechanism that causes prices to 
revert to value. 
The effectiveness of a corrective mechanism is a function of the 
costs and risks involved in informed trading. Information traders’ and 
insiders’ ability to counter price deviations depends on the risk and 
cost involved in the process. Searching for, verifying, analyzing, and 
pricing general market and firm-specific information are costly tasks, 
and capturing the value of a price deviation is a risky undertaking. 
Assume that an information trader estimates that the current share 
price of a hypothetical company, Solid Investment, Inc., is 10 percent 
lower than its projected value. To capture this deviation, the 
information trader must buy the share, hold it until the price reaches 
the projected value, and then sell the share at a profit. Yet the price 
may not reach the estimated value for many reasons. For example, 
the information trader may be wrong, noise traders might keep 
distorting the price for longer than expected, new and unforeseen bad 
news may arrive, a misstatement about the corporation may be 
released to the market, or interest rates or oil prices may go up. Thus, 
the information trader must consider both the size of the deviation 
and the probability of capturing it (i.e., the expected value of the 
deviation). 
To make a profit, the analyst will compare the costs, which are 
certain, with the expected profit from the price deviation—the higher 
the costs, the larger the price deviation necessary to yield a profit. 
That is, with high costs, information traders will not attempt to 
capture small deviations, but will rather let prices get farther away 
from value to increase the expected profit. Alternatively, information 
traders will decrease their investment in information and focus on 
general market information or salient pieces of specific information, 
avoiding attempts to look for fine-tuned information. This strategy 
will lead information traders to capture only large deviations between 
price and value. Either response will result in less accurate pricing 
and a less efficient market. Conversely, when costs are low, 
information traders will invest in more fine-tuned information and 
will counter smaller deviations of price. This, in turn, will lead to 
more accurate prices and more efficient markets. 
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Similarly, reducing the risk associated with the probability of 
capturing the calculated price deviation will increase efficiency—the 
lower the risk, the higher the probability of capturing the price-value 
deviation. Hence information traders will try to capture smaller price-
value deviations. Although some risk elements cannot be lowered 
because they are an integral part of information trader work (e.g., 
revelation of unexpected new information), other risk elements can 
be reduced. Improved information gathering and verification will 
increase the accuracy of information traders’ predictions and reduce 
the frequency of misleading information, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of capturing price-value deviations.69 When information 
traders take precautions to lower the risk of capturing price-value 
deviations, however, their costs increase and market efficiency 
declines. Reducing the costs and risk involved in keeping prices more 
accurate is thus a primary goal to achieve efficient markets. 
Based on this market model, we will demonstrate in the next Part 
how securities regulation promotes the efficiency and liquidity of 
financial markets by reducing the risk and costs born by information 
traders. 
II.  SECURITIES REGULATION:  
ATTAINING EFFICIENT AND LIQUID MARKETS 
Given the market model presented above, it is clear that either 
information traders or insiders should be entrusted with providing 
efficient pricing and liquidity to financial markets. Liquidity traders 
and market makers do not respond to information and thus cannot be 
entrusted with this role. Likewise, noise traders who act irrationally 
cannot be relied upon to underwrite efficient and liquid financial 
markets. 
As this Part will show, insiders and information traders cannot 
coexist as price-value correctors. So regulators must choose between 
these two groups. Securities regulation, by adopting the restriction on 
insider trading, entrusts information traders with the role of providing 
efficient and liquid markets. As a result, securities regulation, through 
disclosure duties and restriction on fraud and manipulation, 
 
 69. Similarly, under normal trading conditions, effective arbitrage will reduce the effect of 
noise traders and lower the risk involved in capturing price deviations. Ronald J. Gilson & 
Reinier R. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight 
Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 733 (2003). 
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minimizes the costs and risks that information traders bear. In the 
paragraphs that follow, we show how the combined effects of 
securities regulation facilitate a competitive market for information 
traders, resulting in the promotion of efficient and liquid markets. 
A. Prohibiting Insider Trading: Choosing the Information Traders 
Information traders cannot discern whether price changes are 
caused by noise traders or by insiders. When noise trading is mixed 
with insider trading, information traders cannot extract information 
from volume or price movements, nor can they deduce the identity of 
the traders.70 Thus, when regulations permit insiders to trade, they 
will consistently beat the information traders. Because information 
traders follow prices and react to information, they will always be on 
the losing end.71 Suppose an analyst, based on the information 
available to her, believes that the price of a certain stock accurately 
reflects its value. Now suppose that an insider is selling the stock on 
account of negative private information she possesses, causing the 
 
 70. Professors Gilson and Kraakman argue that the trading volume or price movements 
may themselves send a message to analysts regarding the nature of the inside information, 
especially if some analysts can deduce the identity of the insider traders. Gilson & Kraakman, 
supra note 7. They have acknowledged, however, that this method is the least efficient way of 
achieving efficient pricing because this process of decoding is imprecise and slow. Id. at 574–79. 
We submit that our assumption is more realistic for several additional reasons. First, it is 
important to note that Gilson and Kraakman’s argument was made regarding a market from 
which noise traders are absent. The addition of noise traders makes it even more difficult for 
analysts to isolate informed trading from uninformed trading, which further reduces the 
efficiency of decoding. Second, empirically, the feasibility of decoding is challenged by the 
finding that markets do not display “strong efficiency” (i.e., insiders do outperform the market). 
See, e.g., Joseph E. Finnerty, Insiders and Market Efficiency, 31 J. FIN. 1141, 1148 (1976) 
(demonstrating that, as a population, insiders outperform the market); H. Nejat Seyhun, 
Insiders’ Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 189, 197–98 (1986) 
(finding that insiders realize modest abnormal profits). That is, analysts are unable to detect the 
nature of the inside information or to deduce the identity of the inside traders during the trade 
so as to prevent abnormal return to insiders. Moreover, even the information about already 
executed and reported insiders’ trades compounded in the SEC’s Official Summary is not always 
exhausted by analysts. See, e.g., Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Special Information and Insider Trading, 47 J. 
BUS. 410, 427–28 (1974) (suggesting that investors can profit from prompt use of the Official 
Summary’s information). Compare Halbert S. Kerr, The Battle of Insider Trading vs. Market 
Efficiency, 6 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 47, 49 (1980) (positing that knowledgeable investors have 
largely eliminated the opportunity to earn excess return by using the information contained in 
the Official Summary), with Raymond Goldie, Are Some Insiders More ‘Inside’ Than Others?, 
10 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 75 (1983) (pointing out that after correcting for methodological 
problems, Kerr’s results show that outsiders can use the Official Summary to earn excess 
returns). 
 71. Haddock & Macey, supra note 44, at 1458–59. 
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stock price to decline. Unaware of the inside information, the analyst 
will interpret this decline as an undervaluation and buy the stock. The 
stock will continue to decline, and only after the negative information 
becomes public will the analyst realize that she bought an overpriced 
stock. The same is true of positive inside information. In this case, a 
security’s price will go up due to insider buying, and the analyst will 
assume overvaluation has occurred and sell short,72 even though the 
shares are underpriced. Information traders cannot diversify away the 
risk of trading against insiders, and will always lose when trading 
against them.73 Thus, when insider trading is pervasive, information 
traders will be unable to recoup their investment in information and 
eventually will exit the market.74 
The imposition of legal restrictions on insiders changes this 
outcome. Consider a legal restriction on insider trading that adopts 
the “disclose or abstain” rule.75 Under this rule, insiders can either 
disclose the inside information they possess and trade on this 
information together with the rest of the market, or abstain from 
trading until some other legal duty forces them to disclose. Absent an 
independent reason to withhold nonpublic information, insiders will 
choose to disclose.76 Once the information is disclosed, insiders and 
information traders compete to capture the value of the information. 
Initially, there will be only a few information traders in the market 
and they will make abnormal returns on investment in information. In 
 
 72. A short sale occurs when an investor is selling a share she does not own. Assume that 
the price of a share is $100 and the investor believes it should trade for only $60. The investor 
can borrow the share (for a fee), then sell the share and get $100. Once the price drops to $60, 
she will buy back the share and return it to the lender. The $40 difference is a profit. Of course, 
if she is wrong and the price goes up, say to $150, she will have to buy back the share for a 
higher price, and thus will lose $50 on this position. 
 73. See Walter Bagehot, The Only Game in Town, 2 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 12, 13 (1971) 
(showing that in a model with informed traders, market makers and liquidity traders, market 
makers always lose to informed traders). 
 74. See, e.g., Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider Trading and the 
Efficiency of Stock Prices, 23 RAND J. ECON. 106, 110–11 (1992) (showing that, in a model with 
outsiders possessing less precise and more costly information than that of an insider, the number 
of informed outsiders declines as a function of the relative precision of the insider’s 
information); Hayne E. Leland, Insider Trading: Should it be Prohibited?, 100 J. PUB. ECON. 
859, 884 (1992) (showing that, in a model with monopolistic insiders possessing more precise 
information than informed outsiders, the welfare of informed outsiders always declines when 
the insiders are trading). 
 75. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 76. See Ranga Narayanan, Insider Trading and the Voluntary Disclosure of Information by 
Firms, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 395, 406–07 (2000) (finding that stringent enforcement of insider 
trading regulations induces more disclosure by firms). 
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this period, the market will be less efficient and less liquid in 
comparison with the preceding stage in which insiders were allowed 
to trade.77 Gradually, however, the number of information traders will 
increase and competition among them will bring down the return on 
investment in information to a competitive rate, thereby attaining a 
more efficient and liquid market.78 
If only a few insiders occasionally violate the restriction and 
trade on inside information, the information traders’ market can still 
function. Although this limited insider trading somewhat limits their 
returns, information traders still profit.79 Accordingly, the level of 
insider trading sets the boundaries of the information traders market. 
When insider trading is limited, a competitive information traders’ 
market will develop; when insider trading is extensive, no information 
traders market will form. This substitution effect between insiders 
and information traders is the key to understanding the ban on 
insider trading. 
Choosing information traders over insiders through the ban on 
insider trading is preferable to favoring insiders over information 
traders. First, insiders enjoy virtual exclusivity over the use of the 
inside information they possess. This insularity from competition 
 
 77. See, e.g., Rezaul Kabir & Theo Vermaelen, Insider Trading Restrictions and the Stock 
Market: Evidence from the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 1591, 1595–97 
(1996) (examining the effect of introducing insider trading restrictions since 1987 on the 
behavior of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and finding that stocks became less liquid, and also 
finding some evidence that the stock market adjusted more slowly to positive earnings news). 
 78. See Fishman & Hagerty, supra note 74, at 118–19 (arguing that insider trading leads to 
less efficient stock prices). Indeed, empirical studies support the model’s prediction. See Utpal 
Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75, 92–93 (2002) 
(finding that initial enforcement of insider trading laws is associated with a significant decrease 
in country-level equity cost of capital); Laura N. Beny, A Comparative Empirical Investigation 
of Agency and Market Theories of Insider Trading 18–19 (Mich. Law & Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 04-004, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=193070 (finding that “countries with tougher . . . laws against insider 
trading have more liquid . . . equity markets” and that “countries with lax . . . insider trading 
laws have less . . . informative stock prices”); Robert M. Bushman et al., Insider Trading 
Restrictions and Analysts’ Incentives to Follow Firms 4–5 (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
the Duke Law Journal), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=373520 (finding that “the intensity 
of analyst coverage (average number of analysts covering followed firms within a country) and 
breadth of coverage (the proportion of domestic listed firms followed by analysts) increase after 
initial enforcement of insider trading laws” and “that this increase is most prominent in 
emerging market and non-liberalized countries”). 
 79. See Jhinyoung Shin, The Optimal Regulation of Insider Trading, 5 J. FIN. 
INTERMEDIATION 49, 63 (1996) (considering the optimal enforcement efforts and costs in a 
model including insiders, informed market professional, and liquidity traders, and concluding 
that tolerating some insider trading can be an optimal regulation policy). 
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allows insiders to manipulate the timing of disclosure—they can 
either delay the disclosure and compromise market efficiency, or 
disclose prematurely and damage the firm’s business.80 Information 
traders, on the other hand, cannot manipulate disclosure. They do not 
control the timing of disclosure, but rather respond to new 
information after it has been revealed. Information traders operate in 
a highly competitive environment, and thus strive to process newly 
disclosed information to the market as quickly as possible, lest they 
be beaten by a rival information trader.81 
Second, information traders can realize economies of scale and 
scope in uncovering, analyzing and pricing general market 
information. Knowledge about general economic conditions or a 
particular industry may be used to analyze many corporations. 
Similarly, information about a particular corporation may shed light 
on related corporations, such as suppliers, customers, or competitors. 
Third, although insiders have a small advantage in searching for firm-
specific information, information traders are better at analyzing and 
pricing this type of information. Although insiders form a single 
nonobjective valuation of their own business decisions, information 
traders provide an objective market valuation that reflects many 
competing independent valuations. Fourth, information traders 
outperform insiders in providing liquidity to financial markets 
because of several factors: the superior financial resources 
information traders have at their disposal; greater divergence of 
opinions among information traders (which triggers more trading); 
and strong competition over the exploitation of any informational 
 
 80. Insiders are also much more likely to manipulate the contents of disclosure. See, e.g., 
Paul Dunn, The Impact of Insider Power on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 30 J. MGMT. 397, 
408 (2004) (finding insider trading more likely to occur when power is concentrated in the hands 
of a few insiders). 
 81. See John Jacob et al., Expertise in Forecasting Performance of Security Analysts, 28 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 51, 79 (1999) (hypothesizing, in light of the study’s results, that competition 
among analysts seems to cause underperformers to be replaced); Patricia C. O’Brien, Forecast 
Accuracy of Individual Analysts in Nine Industries, 28 J. ACCT. RES. 286, 303–04 (1990) 
(suggesting,—based on the results of an empirical study of analysts’ forecast accuracy—that 
analysts compete over the timely incorporation of new information). The overall result of 
choosing analysts rather than insiders is less information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders. See Richard Frankel & Xu Li, Characteristics of a Firm’s Information Environment 
and the Information Asymmetry Between Insiders and Outsiders, 37 J. ACCT. & ECON. 229, 232 
(2004) (noting that outside investors in firms with greater analyst coverage face less information 
asymmetries). 
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advantage—particularly over public information.82 This last point is 
crucial for liquidity traders. For the foregoing reasons, the decision to 
favor information traders over insiders enhances efficiency. 
B. Disclosure Duties: Reducing Search Costs 
Once information traders are entrusted with providing efficiency 
and liquidity to financial markets, they must perform the following 
tasks: search for information, verify its accuracy and then analyze and 
price the information. Each of these tasks entails costs. Lowering 
these costs improves the ability of information traders to counter 
price deviations.83 As these costs decrease, the number of information 
traders operating in the market will increase.84 Therefore, securities 
regulation should strive to reduce the cost of gathering, verifying, and 
pricing information.85 
 
 82. Darren T. Roulstone, Analyst Following and Market Liquidity, 20 CONTEMP. ACCT. 
RES. 551, 554 (2003) (arguing that since analysts provide public information, increased analysts’ 
coverage has a positive association with liquidity). 
 83. See, e.g., Fox et al., supra note 11, at 372–73 (finding that mandatory disclosure 
effectively contributes to share price accuracy); David Gelb & Paul Zarowin, Corporate 
Disclosure Policy and the Informativeness of Stock Prices 19 (June 2000) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=235009 
(finding that “enhanced disclosure results in stock prices that are more informative about future 
earnings, indicating that enhanced disclosure provides information benefits to the stock 
market”); Paul M. Healy et al., Do Firms Benefit from Expanded Voluntary Disclosure? (1995) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (finding that following an increase 
in voluntary disclosures there is a reduction in undervaluation accompanied by an increase in 
stock liquidity, analyst following, and institutional holdings). 
 84. See, e.g., Christine A. Botosan & Mary S. Harris, Motivations for a Change in 
Disclosure Frequency and Its Consequences: An Examination of Voluntary Quarterly Segment 
Disclosures, 38 J. ACCT. RES. 329, 352 (2000) (increased voluntary disclosure leads to increased 
analysts following); Brian J. Bushee & Christopher F. Noe, Corporate Disclosure Practices, 
Institutional Investors, and Stock Return Volatility, 38 J. ACCT. RES. 171, 188–90 (2000) (finding 
that firms with higher AIMR disclosure practices rankings have greater institutional ownership); 
Mark H. Lang & Russell J. Lundholm, Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analyst Behavior, 71 
ACCT. REV. 467, 467 (1996) (“[F]irms with more informative disclosure policies have a larger 
analyst following, more accurate analyst earnings forecasts, less dispersion among individual 
analyst forecasts and less volatility in forecast revisions.”). 
 85. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 5, at 722 (arguing that mandatory disclosure is a subsidy to 
the investment analysts industry that increases analysts activity); Ole-Kristian Hope, Disclosure 
Practices, Enforcement of Accounting Standards and Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy: An 
International Study, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 235, 235 (2003) (finding that “firm-level disclosures are 
positively related to forecast accuracy, suggesting that such disclosures provide useful 
information to analysts” and that strong enforcement of accounting standards is associated with 
higher forecast accuracy); Mark H. Lang et al., ADRs, Analysts, and Accuracy: Does Cross 
Listing in the U.S. Improve a Firm’s Information Environment and Increase Market Value?, 41 J. 
ACCT. RES. 317 (2003) (finding “that firms that cross list on U.S. exchanges have greater analyst 
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Mandatory disclosure duties reduce the cost of searching for 
information. Absent mandatory disclosure duties, information traders 
would engage in duplicative efforts to uncover nonpublic 
information.86 The cost of these efforts would be extremely high 
because information traders, as outsiders, lack access to the 
management of the firm. Disclosure duties pass these costs to the 
individual firm. For the firm, the cost of obtaining firm-specific 
information is rather minimal; indeed, it is a mere by-product of 
managing the firm.87 Moreover, securities regulation mandates a 
specific format for disclosure, which further reduces the costs of 
analyzing information88 and comparing it to data provided by other 
firms.89 
Additionally, disclosure duties reduce the risk involved in 
detecting price-value deviations. First, the more information that is 
disclosed, the lower the risks associated with both insider trading90 
and estimating the fundamental value of the firm. Although 
information traders may discover some undisclosed information by 
investment in searching, other undisclosed information would not be 
revealed even after very costly searches. Given that a corporation 
 
coverage and increased forecast accuracy than firms that are not cross listed” and “that firms 
that have more analyst coverage and higher forecast accuracy have higher valuation”); Carol A. 
Frost et al., Stock Exchange Disclosure and Market Liquidity: An Analysis of 50 International 
Exchanges 29 (Oct. 14, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=355361 (finding “strong support for the hypothesis that 
strength of disclosure system (disclosure rules, monitoring and enforcement, and information 
dissemination) is positively associated with market liquidity, after controlling for stock exchange 
size, legal system and several other proxies for extent of market development and the 
information environment”). 
 86. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 733–34 (noting that under mandatory disclosure rules firms 
avoid the social waste of producing duplicative data). 
 87. See, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond, Optimal Release of Information by Firms, 48 J. FIN. 
1071, 1083, 1089 (1985) (demonstrating that when the cost of releasing information to the firm is 
lower than the aggregate expenditure incurred by investors to acquire the information 
independently, welfare is enhanced if the firm discloses the information). 
 88. See Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, The Optimal Amount of Discretion to 
Allow in Disclosure, 105 Q.J. ECON. 427, 439–40 (1990) (showing that limiting discretion on the 
form of disclosure, perhaps by mandating the use of accepted accounting principles, leads to 
more informative disclosure). 
 89. See Hope, supra note 85, at 235 (finding that “enforcement encourages managers to 
follow prescribed accounting rules, which, in turn, reduces analysts’ uncertainty about future 
earnings” and “disclosures [are] more important when analyst following is low and . . . 
enforcement . . . more important when more choice among accounting methods is allowed”). 
 90. See Shunlong Luo, The Impact of Public Information on Insider Trading, 70 ECON. 
LETTERS 59, 64 (2001) (finding, based on a proposed model, that accurate public information is 
detrimental for insider trading). 
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might avoid disclosure either to promote value or to cover 
mismanagement, one cannot simply draw a negative inference from 
nondisclosure. Information traders must actively search for 
undisclosed information, and if searching will not uncover the 
information they will be forced to estimate its value. Such estimates 
are bound to be imprecise, increasing the risk that information 
traders will fail to capture price or value deviation. Second, by 
increasing the number and activity level of information traders, 
disclosure duties lower the effect of noise traders and the associated 
noise risk.91 Hence, the net effect of mandatory disclosure duties is to 
support a competitive information traders’ market.92 
Competition among information traders creates important 
informational synergies. A vibrant market for information traders 
produces additional information well beyond that mandated by 
disclosure duties and makes it available to all investors free of charge. 
The additional information has two sources. First, a competitive 
information market generates increased demand for firm-specific 
information, which in turn provides managers with incentives to make 
timely and elaborate disclosures beyond what is mandated by law, in 
an attempt to capture the benefits of increased coverage by 
information traders.93 Mandatory disclosure is a prerequisite to the 
formation of a competitive information traders market, but once such 
a market exists it will induce many firms to adopt a more timely, 
elaborate, and fine-tuned disclosure regime than that required by 
mandatory disclosure duties.94 Second, in a competitive market, 
 
 91. Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Why Should Disclosure Rules Subsidize Informal 
Traders, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 417, 424 (1996). Additionally, Professor Georgakopoulos 
argues that disclosure will cause noise traders to reevaluate their mistaken beliefs. Id. However, 
we think that this argument can work both ways: from the noise traders point of view, disclosure 
might fuel the misevaluations. 
 92. Several studies support the proposition that corporate disclosure reduces analysts’ costs 
of searching and processing information. Botosan & Harris, supra note 84, at 352; Bushee & 
Noe, supra note 84, at 188–90; Lang & Lundholm, supra note 84, at 467; Healy et al., supra note 
83. 
 93. See Caramanolis-Çötelli et al., supra note 60, at 146 (presenting a study of Swiss firms 
that shows abnormal returns are significantly and positively affected by the rating measure of 
the informational quality of annual reports, and that a firm’s financial disclosure policy plays a 
signaling role). 
 94. This might explain the finding that foreign corporations that are under less stringent 
SEC disclosure requirements do not exhibit greater information asymmetry compared to U.S. 
corporations. See Andrew W. Alford & Jonathan D. Jones, Financial Reporting and Information 
Asymmetry: An Empirical Analysis of the SEC’s Information-Supplying Exemption for Foreign 
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strong marketing and other pressures will ensure that analytical 
products that would otherwise be confidential are revealed to the 
market. Revealed analytical products, or even pieces of analytical 
products, provide additional information and allow information 
traders to compare and reevaluate their own analysis against the 
published analyses, thereby reducing the costs associated with 
gathering and analyzing the information. Disclosure duties reduce 
duplication of search costs, and to some extent a competitive market 
for information traders eliminates the duplication in analysis costs. 
Finally, the effects that disclosure duties have on information 
traders improve liquidity and thus benefit liquidity traders as well. 
First, more public disclosure leads to fewer instances of asymmetric 
information between traders. Second, more public disclosure lowers 
the expected value of asymmetric information. Indeed, as disclosure 
improves, informational advantages among traders would have to be 
gained through insightful analysis of public information, and not from 
access to inside information.95 Third, disclosure duties subsidize 
search costs and facilitate a competitive market for information 
traders. As competition among information traders intensifies, the 
ability of each individual information trader to exploit informational 
advantages diminishes.96 All these effects reduce the risk that market 
makers face of trading against more informed traders, which in turn 
produces a lower bid-ask spread (i.e., high liquidity). Higher liquidity 
will, in turn, increase trading by liquidity traders and reduce the 
discount rate that traders apply to the market due to asymmetric 
information. Consequently, both increased liquidity and lower cost of 
capital for firms will have a positive effect on the efficiency of the 
market. 
 
Companies, 4 J. CORP. FIN. 373, 395 (1998) (finding no increase in information asymmetry 
between foreign firms and those subject to SEC reporting regulations). 
 95. See Luo, supra note 90, at 64 (finding that public information is detrimental for insiders 
and beneficial for liquidity traders). 
 96. See Caramanolis-Çötelli et al., supra note 60, 133 (arguing that competition among 
analysts reduces investors’ adverse selection problem); Brett Trueman, The Impact of Analyst 
Following on Stock Prices and the Implications for Firms’ Disclosure Policies, 11 J. ACCT., 
AUDITING & FIN. 333, 349 (1996) (showing that there is a positive relation between the number 
of analysts following a firm and the firm’s expected share price, and that this relation is a direct 
consequence of market participants’ inability to observe the number of informed traders in the 
market). 
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C. Restrictions on Fraud and Manipulation: Reducing Verification 
Costs 
Before they rely on information, information traders must invest 
resources in verifying its accuracy.97 The verification process extends 
to both explicit information and implicit information. Absent 
restrictions on fraud and manipulation, all information traders would 
expend resources on verifying the same pieces of information. Of 
course, such duplicative investigations would be socially wasteful. 
Moreover, because information traders are outsiders, the verification 
process is quite costly. Additionally, information traders cannot easily 
detect distortions of implicit information, such as wash sales and 
matched orders, on their own.98 Such a task requires a central 
organized detection and enforcement system like the SEC.99 The ban 
on fraud and manipulation reduces verification costs, because explicit 
information cannot be misstated, material facts cannot be omitted, 
and implicit information cannot be manipulated.100 If a misstatement 
is made or artificial trading (wash sales, matched orders, etc.) occurs, 
criminal and civil sanctions will be imposed.101 It is cheaper to place 
the burden of verifying the information on the information source, 
and doing so avoids duplicative expenditures by multiple information 
traders. Moreover, due to the probabilistic nature of detecting fraud 
(i.e., the probability of detection is lower than one), criminal liability 
may constitute a better deterrent than civil liability that is based on 
 
 97. See Mahoney, supra note 5, at 630–31. 
 98. A wash sale is a practice in which a manipulator opens up a few trading accounts and 
trades, back and forth, between these accounts—being both the seller and the buyer—to create 
the impression of true trading activity. A matched orders activity is similar to a wash sale, except 
that the artificial trade takes place between two persons who coordinate the buying and selling 
by matching their corresponding buy and sell orders. Because the trading is anonymous, 
analysts cannot detect artificial trades and will assume that real activity is taking place. 
 99. See Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes—The Mechanics of Securities Manipulation, 79 
CORNELL L. REV. 219, 285 (1994) (“Perhaps the prevention of manipulation . . . ought to be 
provided by a centralized agency.”). 
 100. See R.J. Koeppe & Co. v. SEC, 95 F.2d 550, 551–53 (7th Cir. 1938) (illustrating how 
Section 9(a) can be used to curtail improper transactions). See generally Lewis D. Lowenfels, 
Sections 9(a)(1) and 9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Analysis of Two 
Important Anti-Manipulative Provisions under the Federal Securities Laws, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 
698 (1991). 
 101. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78(i) (2000). 
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actual damages.102 Improved deterrence reduces the incentive to lie, 
which, in turn, further reduces precaution cost. 
Restrictions on fraud and manipulation also lower the risk 
associated with capturing price-value deviations. Fraud and 
manipulation can affect the analyst at two stages: when the analysis is 
performed and when the prediction is about to materialize. During 
the preparation of the analytic product, the analyst can take 
precautions against misstatements by verifying the information. 
However, it is harder to take precautions after the analytical product 
is done and a trading position is taken. Assume that an analyst 
predicts that by the end of the year the price of a certain stock will 
drop by 20 percent. Assume further that at the end of the year the 
management of the relevant corporation releases a misstatement with 
positive “news” that drives the stock price up. Information traders 
will not be able to capture the value of their investment. To reduce 
the risk of not capturing price-value deviations, information traders 
will have to keep verifying all available information constantly. 
Moreover, even if information traders could invest in precautions and 
discover the misstatement, the activities of noise traders who relied 
on the price distortion might ultimately prevent information traders 
from capturing the price-value deviation. Prohibitions on fraud and 
manipulation minimize precaution costs and reduce the risk of not 
capturing the divergence between value and price. 
Additionally, restrictions on fraud and manipulation preserve the 
value of analysts’ products and protect analysts’ reputation. Some 
analysts rely on and process information, but do not trade. Instead, 
they sell financial analysis to other investors. If they do not trade, 
analysts cannot bring a suit against the source of a misstatement, even 
if they can show that they relied on it.103 Because fraudulent and 
misleading statements distort analysts’ predictions and dilute the 
value of their analysis, investors who purchase the financial analysis 
are clearly adversely affected by the misstatements. Realizing that 
analysts’ predictions could be skewed by fraud or misstatements, 
investors will trust analysts less and adjust downward the price they 
are willing to pay for their services. Worse yet, the distortions caused 
 
 102. See Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit ‘Manipulation’ in 
Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 519–21 (1992) (discussing the difficulty of detecting 
manipulative trades). 
 103. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730–31 (1975) (limiting 
plaintiffs in 10b-5 fraud actions to actual purchasers and sellers). 
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by fraud and manipulation will tarnish the analysts’ reputation, 
making it harder for them to recover their costs. Restrictions on fraud 
and manipulation protect the value of analytical products and the 
reputation of analysts. 
Like mandatory disclosure duties, restrictions on fraud and 
manipulation also create a virtuous cycle. By reducing information 
traders’ precaution costs, restrictions on fraud and manipulation 
facilitate entry into the information traders market and thus increase 
competition among information traders. The enhanced competition 
will, in turn, increase the probability of detecting misstatements and 
fraud, and thereby reduce the incentive for corporations to engage in 
fraud or manipulation. The reduced incentive to release misleading 
information to the market will further decrease information traders’ 
precaution costs, and so on. 
Finally, restrictions on fraud and manipulation also improve 
liquidity, benefiting liquidity traders. Restrictions on fraud and 
manipulation reduce the frequency of misstatements and 
consequently lower the risk of asymmetric information for market 
makers. This, in turn, will lead market makers to lower the bid-ask 
spread.104 Lower spreads will result in higher liquidity, lower cost of 
capital, and improved efficiency. 
D. Avoiding Analysts’ Agency Costs: Facilitating Unbiased Analyses 
The ban on insider trading helps information traders recover 
their investment in information, disclosure duties lower information 
traders’ search costs, and the prohibition on fraud and manipulation 
reduces information traders’ verification costs. Analyzing information 
is the one task that is not directly facilitated by securities regulation; 
rather, it is left to the individual analyst’s talent and resources. 
Although securities regulation does not directly subsidize 
information analysis, disclosure duties indirectly influence the 
analysis. As we have noted, competition among information traders 
creates information spillovers. Some information traders share their 
analysis with the market to obtain media exposure or to give 
prospective customers an opportunity to evaluate their skills. The 
 
 104. Dolgopolov, supra note 48, at 65; see also Mark Klock & D. Timothy McCormick, The 
Impact of Market Maker Competition on Nasdaq Spreads, 34 FIN. REV. 55, 56 (1999) (discussing 
the five variables that affect spread); Sunil Wahal, Entry, Exit, Market Makers and the Bid-Ask 
Spread, 10 REV. FIN. STUD. 871 (1997). 
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analytical products that are disclosed for free allow other information 
traders to evaluate the quality of their own analysis. This process 
reduces learning costs for all information traders. 
The main concern is the agency cost associated with analysis—
i.e., biased analyses and curtailed analyst competition.105 This problem 
is acute with sell-side analysts. Sell-side analysts create an agency cost 
in the form of biased analyses, as they must generate income 
indirectly to make up for the fact that they disclose their analytical 
product for free.106 
The vast majority of analysts, however, do not share the problem 
of sell-side analysts. Buy-side and independent analysts and other 
professional/institutional investors, who do not publish their 
analytical products for free, do not generate intentionally biased 
analyses.107 The problem for this group is not intentionally biased 
opinions, but rather short-term analyses and investment decisions 
that result from the short time horizon used for measuring 
performance.108 However, as we will explain, whereas intervention 
 
 105. For a comprehensive and insightful account of the analysts’ agency problems, see Carl 
R. Chen et al., Are All Security Analysts Equal?, 25 J. FIN. RES. 415, 415 (2002) (showing that 
recommendations from analysts are contaminated by their firms’ investment banking relations 
with corporations); Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking 
the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1041–43 (2003) (“Rather than performing 
independent analysis, analysts have increasingly served as conduits for management to convey 
information to securities markets.”). 
 106. See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing 
Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 285–86 (2003) (explaining that analyst 
must charge a higher initial price for research to recoup the costs before the information is 
disseminated); Fisch & Sale, supra note 105, at 1043–56 (explaining the three types of conflicts 
of interest that analysts face); see also Zhaoyang Gu & Joanna Shuang Wu, Earnings Skewness 
and Analyst Forecast Bias, 35 J. ACCT. & ECON. 5, 6–8 (2003) (noting the strategic-reporting-
bias explanation, establishing it empirically, and offering a complementary explanation to the 
phenomenon). 
 107. Professor Paul Griffin conducted a study which “examin[ed] the response of First Call 
financial analysts to company restatements and corrective disclosures that [led] to an allegation 
of securities fraud and compar[ed] this with the response of three other informed investor 
groups—insiders, short sellers, and institutions.” Paul A. Griffin, A League of Their Own? 
Financial Analysts’ Responses to Restatements and Corrective Disclosures, 18 J. ACCT., 
AUDITING & FIN. 479, 479 (2003). The study found that, although the latter groups “are 
unusually active several months ahead of a corrective disclosure event,” the analysts respond 
only after the event. Id. 
 108. See Jane M. Cote & Debra L. Sanders, Herding Behavior: Explanations and 
Implications, 9 BEHAV. RES. ACCT. 20, 20 (1997), (explaining that forecast consensus among 
analysts is in part a product of limited time). See generally Scott E. Stickel, Reputation and 
Performance Among Security Analysts, 48 J. FIN. 1811 (1992) (measuring analyst performance 
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through securities regulation is warranted for sell-side analysts, in the 
case of buy-side analysts, there is no need for similar intervention and 
the problem should be left to the market. We start with the sell-side 
analysts. 
The choice between information traders and insiders as to who 
will perform the role of providing efficiency and liquidity to the 
market entails a choice between two types of agency costs. 
Specifically, sell-side analysts present a tradeoff between analysts’ 
agency costs and management agency costs. Allowing insider trading 
aggravates the problem of management agency costs as it forces 
information traders to exit the market, leaving insiders with no 
incentive to monitor themselves. On the other hand, restricting 
insider trading and relying on information traders gives rise to a sell-
side analysts’ agency cost. Given the close media attention to the 
problem of sell-side analysis, one might be tempted to argue that 
management agency costs are lower than sell-side analysts’ agency 
costs.109 This, however, is not the case. 
The management agency cost stems from the governance 
structure of all publicly traded corporations.110 It affects all aspects of 
business operations and is liable to cause problems, such as 
mismanagement, misreporting, and self-dealing. It also leads to 
inferior pricing and insufficient liquidity.111 Corporate law and part of 
securities regulation are aimed at curtailing management agency cost. 
The sell-side analyst agency cost, on the other hand, is a much 
more limited problem. The sell-side analyst agency cost is a problem 
of disclosure, and concerns only a small subgroup of informed 
traders—namely, sell-side analysts—who may produce distorted 
analyses with respect to certain corporations.112 
 
based upon “(1) forecast accuracy, (2) frequency of forecast issuance, and (3) impact of forecast 
on security prices.”). 
 109. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, A Free Market Model of a Large Corporation System, 52 
EMORY L.J. 1381, 1390 (2003) (arguing that agency costs are “extremely high” and inefficient in 
the management context). 
 110. See Jensen, supra note 19, at 323 (discussing the agency costs implicit in the 
manager/shareholder relationship). 
 111. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 5, at 1254. 
 112. Among analysts, approximately 30 percent are sell-side analysts, 60 percent are buy-
side analysts, and about 10 percent are independent analysts. Fisch & Sale, supra note 105, at 
1041. Moreover, the 60 percent buy-side analysts proportionally command far more resources 
than other types of analysts. Id. 
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The agency cost of sell-side analysts can be further reduced 
through appropriate regulation.113 The biased analyses and curtailed 
competition that characterize sell-side analysts may stem from 
selective disclosure by management,114 from analysts’ desire to 
promote the business of the investment banker who employs them,115 
or from their own personal investments.116 Securities regulation 
mitigates these problems by restricting selective disclosure and 
mandating equal access to information.117 Specifically, it requires 
disclosure of employment relationships and personal or institutional 
conflicts.118 In so doing, securities regulation improves the integrity of 
information analysis.119 
The problem of the buy-side analysts is more fundamental, but 
securities regulation cannot remedy it. If the performance of an 
 
 113. See id. at 1056–77 (presenting and analyzing the existing and the proposed regulations, 
and offering an alternative solution). 
 114. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Is Selective Disclosure Now Lawful?, N.Y. L.J., July 31, 1997, at 
5 (discussing United States v. O’Hagan and describing and analyzing the practice of selective 
disclosure in which management provides inside information to a group of selective analysts 
ahead of the market). 
 115. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 105, 1045 (describing the conflict when recommendations 
are tied to brokerage commissions and underwriting business); Hsiou-wei Lin & Maureen F. 
McNichols, Underwriting Relationships, Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts and Investment 
Recommendations, 25 J. ACCT. & ECON. 101, 101 (1998) (examining “the effect of underwriting 
relationships on analysts’ earnings forecasts and recommendations”); Roni Michaely & Kent L. 
Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations, 12 
REV. FIN. STUD. 653, 653 (1999) (“[T]he recommendations by underwriter analysts show 
significant evidence of bias.”); see also Editorial, SEC Warns Investors Against Sell-Side 
Conflicts, INVESTOR REL. BUS., July 9, 2001, at 3 (discussing an SEC alert describing the 
conflicts between sell side analyst and “their investment banking bosses”). 
 116. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 105, at 1043–45. (describing the conflict when analysts 
invest in the companies they cover). 
 117. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 5, at 1269–73 (analyzing the effects of FD 
Regulation); Frank Helfin et al., Regulation FD and the Financial Information Environment: 
Early Evidence, 78 ACCT. REV. 1, 1 (2003) (presenting the findings of a study after the 
implementation of FD Regulation that showed: (1) “improved informational efficiency of stock 
prices prior to earnings announcements”; (2) “no reliable evidence of change in analysts’ 
earnings forecast errors or dispersion”; and (3) “a substantial increase in the volume of firms’ 
voluntary, forward-looking, earnings-related disclosures”). See generally Robert B. Thompson 
& Ronald King, Credibility and Information in Securities Markets after Regulation FD, 79 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 615 (2001) (analyzing the effects of FD Regulation). 
 118. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 105, at 1068–69 (discussing Regulation Analyst 
Certification, 17 C.F.R. § 242 (2002)). 
 119. See Leslie Boni & Kent L. Womack, Wall Street Research: Will New Rules Change Its 
Usefulness?, 59 FIN. ANAL. J. 25, 29 (2003) (“In summary, the new rules and global research 
settlement are likely to reduce perceived conflicts of interest.”). 
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analyst who works for a hedge fund120 is being evaluated on a 
quarterly basis, the investment decisions the analyst makes will reflect 
this short time horizon. Such investment decisions might tend toward 
the speculative. The tendency to speculate might increase noise 
trading and cause short-term inefficiencies.121 Although prices will 
revert to value in the long run,122 in the short term excess volatility 
and distorted prices may exist.123 The more prevalent short-term 
analysis is the higher the risk of short-term market inefficiency. 
Indeed, financial institutions that can avoid the short-horizon 
problem can profit at the expense of the short-horizon investors. 
Overcoming the short-horizon problem, however, is a tricky task. It 
requires an ability to evaluate analysts’ performance ex ante (rather 
than ex post based on actual performance) or finding a sufficiently 
large pool of long-term investors who do not care about short-term 
profits. Evaluating analysts based on their ex ante decisions requires 
reviewing the same dataset the analyst had, ensuring that no relevant 
information was ignored, and forming a pricing model that compares 
all available investment options. One who is capable of performing all 
these tasks is unlikely to need analytic services in the first place. 
Finding long-term investors is complicated as well. Investors 
compare the performance of their fund with other funds. If one fund 
is doing better than others in the short term purely due to luck, 
investors will switch to the “successful” fund.124 The managers of this 
fund will make more money and have more resources to invest, while 
other funds will have less of both. A fund that invests based on long-
term considerations might show losses or slow growth for a long time 
 
 120. Hedge funds are private investment vehicles for wealthy individuals or institutional 
investors. See generally William Fung & David A. Hsieh, A Primer on Hedge Funds, 6 J. EMP. 
FIN. 309 (1999) (describing the history, rationale, and organization of hedge funds). 
 121. See Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, 
4 J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 23 (1990) (describing how noise traders may increase demand based on 
the advice of financial gurus or brokers). 
 122. See James M. Poterba & Lawrence H. Summers, Mean Reversion in Stock Prices: 
Evidence and Implications, 22 J. FIN. ECON. 27, 28 (1988) (documenting the presence of mean 
reversion, and studying its effect on investors’ portfolio decisions given the investment horizon). 
 123. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Permanent and Temporary Components of 
Stock Prices, 96 J. POL. ECON. 246, 248 (1988) (explaining how a shock to expected returns 
affects the short but not long term); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The New Theory of 
the Firm: Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 148, 151 
(1990) (illustrating that price will revert to value in the long run regardless of noise trading). 
 124. For a colorful description of the securities investment industry and the phenomenon 
described in the text, see generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS: THE 
HIDDEN ROLE OF CHANCE IN THE MARKETS AND IN LIFE (2001). 
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while other funds are showing huge profits and growth. It is not easy 
to convince investors that these losses are due to a calculated and 
informed long-term investment strategy, rather than incompetence.125 
Thus, it might be more profitable to follow the trend of short-term 
investment or speculation.126 
This is a typical market problem that cannot, however, be 
remedied through legal intervention. The incentives to solve this 
problem and make money for long-term investors are in place, and 
indeed, some institutions have solved this problem through 
reputation, the use of “patient” money, or private money. As this 
group of investors grows, the short-term efficiency of the market will 
improve. In any case, it must be emphasized that whatever the 
distortions caused due to short-horizon problems, this is the best one 
can get out of a free market. Any improvement will not come from 
the law, but rather from education, social norms, and market learning 
and incentives. 
E. Agency Costs and Corporate Law 
In addition to facilitating a competitive market for information 
traders, securities regulation complements corporate law in reducing 
management agency costs.127 First, by restricting insider trading, 
securities regulation avoids entrusting the role of providing efficiency 
and liquidity to insiders, thereby preventing the problem of self-
 
 125. One might be tempted to mention Warren Buffet as such an exception. 
 126. See Hirshleifer & Teoh, supra note 63, at 25 (reviewing studies of herding behavior); 
Scott E. Stickel, Reputation and Performance Among Security Analysts, 48 J. FIN. 1811, 1811 
(1992) (charging that All-American analysts are more successful in part because they revise 
their forecasts more often); Brett Trueman, Analyst Forecasts and Herding Behavior, 7 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 97, 98 (1994) (illustrating how short-term speculation allows analysts to charge 
higher fees). 
 127. In the corporate structure there are agency problems between three pairs of groups: 
shareholders (principals) and managers (agents); minority shareholders (principals) and 
controlling shareholders (agents); and creditors (principals) and shareholders (agents). REINIER 
R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 21–22 (2004). In each relationship the agent controls the investment 
of the principal and due to conflict of interest and information asymmetry, the agent can further 
her interest at the expense of the principal. Measures designed to resolve these agency problems 
entail a cost, widely known as agency cost. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 16, at 354–55 
(defining agency costs). The primary role of corporate law is to minimize agency costs, most 
notably by imposing fiduciary duties on the board of directors and the management, and 
requiring corporate governance mechanisms. See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra, at 22 (explaining 
each type of agency problem and arguing that “[l]aw can play an important role in reducing 
agency costs”). 
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monitoring by insiders. Second, by facilitating a competitive market 
for information traders, securities regulation provides shareholders 
with a market-monitoring mechanism that supplements the internal 
monitoring provided by the board of directors.128 Indeed, analysts’ 
reports provide the board with valuable information about the 
performance of the management.129 Third, a competitive information 
traders market provides valuable feedback as to the quality of 
management, and thereby may directly affect the value of 
management’s compensation package. Fourth, analysts’ opinions 
about management quality inform shareholders’ votes on corporate 
resolutions and influence their decisions to buy, hold, or sell the 
corporation shares. Finally, analysts’ signal about management 
quality also benefits the market for corporate control and suppliers of 
corporate credit. 
Market monitoring also complements courts’ judicial oversight of 
agency problems. Management agency costs can assume one of two 
forms. The first is intentional taking: outright stealing, self-dealing, or 
excessive compensation. In corporate law, all cases of intentional 
takings are lumped under the heading of breach of duty of loyalty.130 
The second category of agency cost is mismanagement: inefficient 
investments aimed at “empire building,”131 value-decreasing 
 
 128. See Kee H. Chung & Hoje Jo, The Impact of Security Analysts’ Monitoring and 
Marketing Functions on the Market Value of Firms, 31 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 493, 493 (1996) 
(showing that analysts’ monitoring and marketing exert a “significant and positive effect on 
firms’ market value”); Doukas et al., supra note 23, at 54 (supplying empirical evidence showing 
that “security analysis acts as a monitor to reduce the agency costs associated with separation of 
ownership and control”); Marc J. Epstein & Krishna G. Palepu, What Financial Analysts Want, 
80 STRATEGIC FIN. 48, 50 (1999) (showing results from a survey of 140 star sell-side analysts 
that found 87 percent of these analysts believe that boards of directors “represent[] the interests 
of corporate management [and] not the interests of the other stakeholders”); Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 
CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1132 (2003) (discussing the dual monitoring roles of the board of directors 
and market and related institutions); R. Charles Moyer et al., Security Analyst Monitoring 
Activity: Agency Costs and Information Demands, 24 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 503 (1989) 
(supplying empirical support for analysts’ monitoring role). 
 129. Gordon, supra note 128, at 1132. 
 130. See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1161 (Del. 1995) 
(discussing undisclosed material conflicts during a merger negotiation as breach of loyalty); A.P. 
Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953) (sustaining a corporate charitable 
donation); Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 121 N.E. 378, 492 (N.Y. 1918) 
(discussing manager loyalty in the context of contractual negotiation). 
 131. See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 627 
(1989) (“[M]anagers may want to increase the size of their firms and to diversify, even if this 
reduces the return on the shareholders’ investment . . . . Incentives to increase size include 
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diversifying mergers and takeovers, or distorted business decisions. In 
corporate law, cases of mismanagement fall under the heading of 
breach of the duty of care.132 Cases of intentional takings fascinate the 
media and the public, but mismanagement is in fact a much more 
acute problem.133 
Courts are competent to address breaches of duty of loyalty. 
Identifying taking or stealing within the corporate context does not 
involve second-guessing management’s business decisions. Once a 
taking has been disclosed, courts can provide a remedy.134 On the 
other hand, courts are ill-suited to handle breaches of the duty of 
care, as identifying mismanagement requires second-guessing 
management’s business decisions. Indeed, in dealing with 
mismanagement cases, courts have adopted the “business judgment 
rule,”135 according to which courts abstain from second-guessing 
business decisions except in extreme cases.136 Moreover, legislators 
have permitted corporations to exempt directors from monetary 
damages arising from a breach of their duty of care.137 Hence, 
responsibility for handling breaches of the duty of care has moved 
away from courts to the market. 
Market mechanisms and institutions are aimed primarily at 
restricting mismanagement through competition, whereas regulation 
of intentional takings is mostly left for courts and social norms.138 The 
analysts’ market reduces the more crucial type of agency cost, 
mismanagement. Analysts follow management actions, evaluate 
managerial decisions, and incorporate this information into stock 
 
managers’ desire for greater prestige and visibility, the desire of the chief executive officer to 
leave a legacy and not be a mere caretaker, and compensation structures that reward growth in 
sales and profits. These incentives for growth may lead managers to overinvest, either by 
expanding their own business or by buying a new business.”). 
 132. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 133. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 134. See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, Shareholder Litigation: Reexamining 
the Balance Between Litigation Agency Costs and Management Agency Costs (Vanderbilt Univ. 
Law School Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 02-10, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=336162 (suggesting that, in Delaware, plaintiffs are more 
likely to succeed in cases involving breaches of the duty of loyalty or self dealing). 
 135. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 136. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (holding that where 
“there [are] no allegations of fraud, bad faith, or self dealing, or proof thereof . . . it is presumed 
that directors reached business judgment in good faith”). 
 137. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2005). 
 138. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 22, at 1661 (discussing the duty of loyalty and social 
norms). 
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prices. Even though it is not their primary role, analysts who follow 
corporations may also detect fraud, intentional taking, and theft by 
management.139 The more developed the analysts market, the more 
effective it is in reducing agency costs.140 
Indeed, the distinction between corporate law, whose goal is to 
reduce corporate agency costs, and securities regulation, the goal of 
which is to facilitate a competitive market for analysts, is not so 
clear.141 Although the essential role of securities regulation is to 
facilitate a market for information traders, it also contains provisions 
that aim partially or wholly at improving corporate governance 
structure.142 For instance, the proxy rules, which mandate full 
disclosure before a shareholders’ vote,143 the Williams Act, which 
mandates specific procedure for tender offers144 and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act,145 which mandates certain structures for a board and audit 
committee and establishes certain procedures to assure the quality of 
corporate reports,146 can all be viewed as establishing corporate 
governance structures and not facilitating a market for information 
traders. 
Several reasons account for the blurred line between securities 
regulation and corporate law. First, many of what seem to be 
corporate-governance elements in securities regulation also facilitate 
a market for information traders. For instance, improved accounting 
practices reduce information traders’ verification costs.147 Also, the 
 
 139. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1983) (detailing how analysts expose 
corporate fraud). 
 140. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 141. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: 
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860–62 (2003) (explaining how securities 
fraud litigation serves to regulate corporate governance structure). 
 142. See Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State 
Law, and Federal Regulations, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 961 (2003) (providing a view of 
how the stock exchanges, Delaware, and the federal government can operate together to reduce 
corporate agency costs). 
 143. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 285–88 (8th ed. 2000) (providing an overview of proxy rules). 
 144. Id. at 1136–40. 
 145. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (an act aimed at 
protecting investors and improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosure). 
 146. See generally Brian Kim, Recent Developments, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 HARV. J. 
LEGIS. 235 (2003) (describing the provisions of the Act). 
 147. See Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 136–37 (2002) (discussing the changes in accounting 
practices anticipated following the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation and the expected increased 
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requirement that potential acquirers wishing to buy more than 5 
percent of the shares must disclose their tender offer intentions 
protects information traders against a substantial risk of nonpublic 
“outsider” information.148 And the opposite is true as well: elements 
in securities regulation aimed at facilitating a market for information 
traders also reduce agency cost. For example, the restriction on fraud 
and manipulation reduces information traders’ verification costs, but 
also curbs the agency cost that is the source of management’s motive 
to defraud.149 
Second, although in theory states compete for the role of 
providing efficient corporate governance, in practice the only real 
competition faced by the leading incorporation state, Delaware, is 
from the federal government.150 Securities regulation is the federal 
government’s main tool for averting a race to the bottom in corporate 
governance issues. Thus, corporate governance issues that the federal 
government believes are not adequately handled by the states will 
likely find their way into securities regulation.151 
This competition illustrates an important tie between securities 
regulation and corporate law. For capital markets to prosper, 
shareholder protection is necessary.152 When shareholder value can 
 
transparency in corporate reporting). See generally Pankaj Jain et al., The Effect of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 on Market Liquidity (14th Annual Conference on Fin. Econ. & Accounting, 
Mar. 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=488142 (a 
study analyzing market liquidity measures before and after Sarbanes-Oxley and finding that the 
Act reduced information asymmetry and improved the disclosure and transparency of corporate 
information). 
 148. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 5, at 1274–76 (discussing the impact of 
“outside private information”). 
 149. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carrey, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities 
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL L. REV. 691, 699 (pointing out that it is managers 
who make misstatement not corporations, and thus securities fraud should be viewed as a form 
of management agency costs, e.g., managers trying to increase their pay through stock 
manipulation, or to hide their business failures by cooking the books). 
 150. See EISENBERG, supra note 143, at 106 (“[B]ecause of its historical success in . . . [the] 
market, Delaware is more threatened by the possibility of comprehensive federal 
intervention.”); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 590 (2003) 
(“Delaware’s chief competitive pressure comes not from the other state but from the federal 
government.”). 
 151. See Roe, supra note 150, at 600 (“[N]otwithstanding the internal affairs doctrine, the 
federal government can displace state corporate law, and it has . . . . [T]he securities laws 
themselves can directly pull corporate law issues away from the states.”). 
 152. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities 
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 783 (2001) (arguing that “two essential prerequisites for strong 
public securities markets” are “good information about the value of a company’s business” and 
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easily be expropriated, it is hard for a market for information traders 
to develop. Sophisticated analytical product about the future 
performance of the corporation is useless if the public shareholders 
are not going to receive any of the future profits. Analysts might try 
to supply monitoring services to guard shareholders against 
expropriation, but these services are ineffective without substantive 
rights and effective methods for enforcement. This is especially true 
in countries where concentrated ownership is coupled with ineffective 
enforcement in courts.153 From this perspective, the competition from 
the federal government can be seen as aiming to preserve the 
information traders market. If state shareholder protections are 
ineffective, this will eventually harm the information traders market 
and consequently the capital market. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the reduction in agency costs 
also benefits corporations. Liquidity traders hold portfolios of shares. 
Agency costs reduce the value of corporations and thus the total 
return on a market portfolio. Consequently, liquidity traders discount 
the shares to reflect the risk of agency costs. This, in turn, increases 
the cost of capital for corporations. The greater the agency costs, the 
greater the discount. Improving disclosure to facilitate a competitive 
market for information traders leads to lower agency costs. As 
liquidity traders apply lower discounts in response to the lower 
agency costs, the cost of capital decreases, and the whole market 
benefits. 
In an important article, Professor Paul Mahoney argues against 
our position that securities regulation should facilitate a market for 
information traders.154 In his view, the historic role of securities 
regulation was to reduce management agency costs, and this should 
continue to be its appropriate role.155 Accordingly, securities 
regulation should focus on mandating the disclosure of clearly 
 
“confidence that the company’s insiders . . . won’t cheat investors out of most or all of the value 
of their investment through ‘self-dealing’ transactions . . . or even outright theft”). 
 153. See Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets 
Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 393, 435 (2003) (describing Italy as such a case). 
 154. Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1047, 1111 (1995) (“The accuracy enhancement model of mandatory disclosure . . . . 
[I]mportant and interesting as it is, has little relevance to real-world mandatory disclosure 
systems.”). 
 155. See id. at 1051–52 (“The evident purpose of such disclosures is to help the shareholders 
monitor management’s self-interested behavior. By reducing monitoring costs, disclosure 
reduces overall agency losses.”). 
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verifiable information, conservative accounting requirements, 
management compensation packages, and self-dealings.156 Because, in 
Mahoney’s view, management agency cost takes the form of fraud, 
self-dealing, or excessive compensation, a limited disclosure is 
sufficient to achieve the goal of reducing management agency cost. 
Mandating the disclosure of soft, forward-looking information, 
current values accounting, and other detailed pieces of business 
information is wasteful because, instead of reducing management 
agency costs, these requirements aim at the elusive goal of achieving 
efficient markets through mandatory disclosure.157 
This view, however, is based on an incomplete account of the 
management agency problem and the role of information traders in 
reducing it. Professor Mahoney is concerned with breaches of the 
duty of loyalty, and would like to confine mandatory disclosure to this 
end. However, although it is true that limited disclosure will still 
reduce agency cost caused by breach of the duty of loyalty, it will not 
reduce agency cost caused by breach of the duty of care. Courts are 
ineffective in monitoring duty-of-care breaches. Only information 
traders can detect and curtail mismanagement because liquidity 
traders do not search for information, noise traders are irrational, and 
insiders are not going to monitor themselves. If disclosure were 
limited to information concerning stealing or taking, information 
traders’ search costs for all other types of information would increase. 
Higher search cost would result in fewer information traders and 
fewer analytical products. 
Lowering search costs is crucial to facilitating the development of 
the information traders market. Given that information traders are 
concerned with all aspects of business operation, requiring the 
disclosure only of those transactions that involve self-dealing, 
management’s compensation, and hard information would provide 
information traders with only partial information. Information traders 
must also know details about business decisions, different lines of 
business, and soft, forward-looking information.158 Thus, even if one 
 
 156. See id. at 1105–11 (contrasting “policy prescriptions of the agency cost model with 
those of the accuracy enhancement model” via SEC disclosure initiatives). 
 157. See id. at 1111 (“The fact that mandatory disclosure began as a means of controlling 
agency costs does not mean that it should not be used to achieve the goal of accuracy 
enhancement if it can do so cost- effectively. The hurdles blocking that result, however, seem 
dauntingly high.”). 
 158. For empirical evidence indicating that mandatory disclosure does improve analysts’ 
forecast accuracy, see, for example, Afshad J. Irani, The Effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on 
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thinks that the role of securities regulation should be to minimize 
agency costs, it must be recognized that this role, too, can be 
performed by the information traders market. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITIES REGULATION 
The analysis hitherto provides a powerful tool for resolving 
policy debates over key issues in securities regulation. In this Part, we 
discuss in detail the implications of our theory for two such debates. 
A. Mandatory Disclosure 
Probably the most debated issue in securities regulation is 
whether disclosure duties should be mandatory. Opponents of 
mandatory disclosure argue that the market gives corporations 
sufficient incentives to disclose all material information; otherwise, 
investors will assume the worst and discount the value of their 
securities.159 Mandatory disclosure, they argue, is costly and useless160 
because markets are efficient and thus already incorporate all the 
relevant information.161 Disclosure, therefore, should be elective.162 
 
the Relevance of Conference Calls to Financial Analysts, 22 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 
15, 26 (2004). 
 159. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of 
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 683 (1984); see also Steven A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in 
Financial Markets: Implications of Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES IN 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 177 (Franklin Edwards ed., 1979) (providing a signaling model in 
which good firms have incentives to disclose and investors assume bad news from silence). 
 160. See, e.g., Barbara Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf 
Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135, 176–84 (1984) (arguing that 
improvement in price accuracy through increased underwriter liability is not worthwhile). 
 161. The classic studies tested the effect of imposing mandatory disclosure laws in the U.S. 
during the 1930s and concluded that these laws yielded no efficiency gains. George Benston, 
Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 153 (1973); George Stigler, Public Regulation of Securities 
Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117, 122–24 (1964). For a critical review of these studies, see Merritt B. Fox, 
Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 
VA. L. REV. 1335, 1369–95 (1999). 
 162. A different argument, which is outside the scope of our discussion, is the claim that the 
mandatory disclosure rules should not be enacted by the (monopolistic) federal government, 
but rather by an alternative competitive regime for securities regulation (countries, states, stock 
exchanges, etc.). Under this argument, corporations would be allowed to choose the registration 
venue that provides them with the preferred level of mandatory disclosure. See Stephen J. Choi 
& Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities 
Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 950 (1998) (“If the issuer could choose to comply with the 
laws of any regimes the issuer would be able to choose a very strict [mandatory disclosure] 
regime, thereby demonstrating the quality of the issue and increasing the price of the 
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Proponents of mandatory disclosure counter with various 
justifications.163 The gist of these justifications is that information has 
characteristics that prevent optimal supply; it is a “public good” and 
hence creates externalities.164 Most justifications focus on the supply 
side (the corporation) in explaining why competition will not result in 
optimal disclosure. First, information disclosed by a corporation 
provides value to actual or potential competitors, and enables them to 
evaluate their position vis-à-vis the disclosing corporation and 
respond to the disclosed information (e.g., stop or accelerate research 
and development, change marketing or pricing strategy, or enter or 
exit a market).165 Second, disclosure provides value to creditors, 
employees, suppliers and consumers of the disclosing corporation, 
allowing them to improve their negotiation position vis-à-vis the 
corporation.166 Third, the information provides value to prospective 
investors who are not current shareholders of the corporation, 
allowing them to better compare the corporation with alternative 
investments in composing a portfolio that might exclude or include 
the corporation’s securities.167 Because the corporation can neither 
charge for these benefits nor exclude nonpaying parties from using 
the information, the corporation will underdisclose information.168 In 
fact, each corporation would prefer to free ride on the benefit 
generated by the disclosure of other corporations and minimize its 
own disclosure. In sum, the misalignment between the private and 
social value of information justifies mandatory disclosure. 
 
security.”); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2395 (1998) (“[A] state could further offer firms a menu of 
regimes from which to choose (such as the choice of an extensive disclosure regime, a more 
limited disclosure regime, and a merit review regime).”). 
 163. For an overview of these justifications, see KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 127, at 204–
07. 
 164. For an excellent analysis of this justification, see Fox, supra note 161, at 1393–95; Dale 
A. Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure Requirement for Publicly 
Traded Corporations: “Are We There Yet?,” 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 135, 198–201 (1998). 
 165. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 159, at 677; Oesterle, supra note 164, at 198–99. 
 166. See Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 42, at 480 (“[S]ince disclosure reveals information 
to competitors or others who act strategically with the firm, it may cause the firm to lose 
competitive advantage or bargaining power in various contexts.”). 
 167. See Oesterle, supra note 164, at 200 (“[F]irms who provide information will benefit not 
only their own shareholders, by augmenting the value of their own stock, but also investors in 
other firms.”). 
 168. See Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 42, at 482 (noting that disclosure decisions of each 
firm do “not take into account the informational spillovers that occur when . . . disclosure is 
used to value other firms,” rendering the equilibrium outcome inefficient). 
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These arguments seem to prove too much, however, given that 
they also support mandating disclosure by closely held corporations. 
Information regarding corporations that are not publicly traded is 
also a public good that will be underproduced by the market. If 
society gains from closing the gap between social and private values 
through mandatory disclosure, why limit mandatory disclosure to 
publicly traded corporations? The answer is that imposing mandatory 
disclosure on publicly traded corporations provides additional 
benefits such as liquidity, efficient public pricing, and monitoring of 
management, that are not present in the case of closely held 
corporations.169 
It is possible, however, to think of a different justification for 
mandatory disclosure, one that focuses on sell-side analysts. 
According to this justification, absent mandatory disclosure, there will 
be both over- and underinvestment in securities research.170 On the 
one hand, because analytical products are also a public good, analysts 
will underinvest in securities research (i.e., too few corporations will 
be followed).171 On the other hand, multiple analysts will make 
duplicative investments in attempting to find the same pieces of 
(undisclosed) information about the corporation, leading to social 
waste.172 Mandatory disclosure reduces both problems, because it 
subsidizes search and verification efforts and eliminates duplicative 
investment. 
Our analysis supports this reasoning. It explains why mandatory 
disclosure is limited to publicly traded corporations and it elucidates 
the relationship between disclosure and informed trading. Our 
analysis reveals, however, that the justification for mandatory 
disclosure should not be limited to the special case of sell-side 
analysts. Sell-side analysts normally publish their reports for free and 
 
 169. See, e.g., Kin Lo, Economic Consequences of Regulated Changes in Disclosure: The 
Case of Executive Compensation, 35 J. ACCT. & ECON. 285 (2003) (finding that forcing the 
disclosure of executive compensation has benefited shareholders by inducing corporate 
governance improvements); Manuel A. Utset, Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 540, 598–99 (1995) (arguing that mandatory disclosure can help shareholders 
overcome a problem of strategic disclosure by managers and improve monitoring). 
 170. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 722 (“A mandatory disclosure system can . . . be seen as a 
desirable cost reduction strategy through which society, in effect, subsidizes search costs to 
secure both a greater quantity of information and a better testing of its accuracy.”). 
 171. Id. at 731–32. 
 172. Id. at 733–34; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 159, at 682; Oesterle, supra note 164, 
at 201–02. 
01__GOSHEN_PARCHOMOVSKY.DOC 8/22/2006  8:47 AM 
758 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:711 
expect to benefit indirectly through other business activities.173 Most 
information traders, however, use buy-side analysts. Buy-side analysts 
do not publish their research; nor do they try to sell it. Thus, they do 
not face the public good problem in securities research. On the 
contrary, these analysts guard the confidentiality of their product as 
they attempt to profit from trading. Our model justifies mandatory 
disclosure from the buy-side perspective as well. 
First, mandatory disclosure reduces search cost because it is 
cheaper for the corporation to disclose than for an outsider to 
unearth firm-specific information. Indeed, producing firm-specific 
information is an integral byproduct of managing the business, and 
the added cost of disclosing it is marginal.174 Second, some undisclosed 
pieces of information cannot be discovered even at very high cost. 
The pricing of such information is based on estimates as to its 
existence, nature, and value. Such pricing is bound to be imprecise. 
Third, here too, disclosure by the corporation prevents duplicative 
investments in (undisclosed) corporate information for all types of 
information traders. And fourth, mandatory disclosure subsidizes 
search costs for all information traders. In this case, the public good 
characteristics of information produce a benefit for the market: the 
small investment made by the corporation in disclosure of 
information effects enormous savings in search costs for all 
information traders. 
Our model provides yet another justification for mandatory 
disclosure. Mandatory disclosure enables information traders to 
exploit economies of scale and scope in analyzing information. Just as 
general market information may be used to price the stocks of many 
firms, information about any individual firm may be used to price the 
stocks of other corporations that compete or interact with that 
corporation. It is the disclosure by all the firms in the market that 
enables information traders to fully realize economics of scale and 
scope in analyzing information.175 Hence, the desirability of 
 
 173. See Chen et al., supra note 105, at 415–16 (arguing that “analysts can increase investors’ 
knowledge of the companies, which in turn, is expected to increase the valuation of the 
company”). 
 174. For instance, the total sales figure is reported to the top management. To disclose this 
figure costs very little, whereas this figure is very costly for analysts to obtain otherwise. 
 175. Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 42, at 513–14 (showing that positive externalities 
result from information and liquidity spillovers due to improved disclosures by other firms). 
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mandatory disclosure can best be seen from a general market 
perspective, not that of the individual firm.176 
To illustrate this point, assume no mandatory disclosure and a 
market with one hundred firms. One firm fully discloses and the rest 
only partially disclose. Information traders cannot use the 
information they have about the disclosing firm and the general 
market information to price other firms without investing in search 
costs for the remaining 99 firms. Given high search costs and limited 
ability to exploit economies of scale and scope, the market will 
support very few information traders. With very few information 
traders, competition will be low, efficiency and liquidity will be low, 
and no positive externalities will be generated. Assume now that a 
second firm fully discloses. The search cost for this individual firm will 
be saved, and the information gained about the general market and 
the first disclosing firm can be applied to the second firm at a small 
additional cost. Moreover, the knowledge gained about the second 
firm might improve the knowledge about the first firm. The increased 
disclosure will lead to increased savings in search costs, resulting in 
greater economies of scale and scope. As disclosure improves, more 
information traders will enter the market and competition will 
intensify. Intense competition among information traders, in turn, will 
generate more efficient and liquid markets as well as significant 
positive externalities for the economy. 
More importantly, our model provides a new explanation as to 
why corporations cannot be trusted to voluntarily provide full 
disclosure. What will a corporation gain (or lose) from full disclosure? 
Or, stated differently, what will a corporation gain (or lose) from the 
existence of a competitive information traders market? The first 
benefit is improved liquidity for the corporation’s securities.177 
Improved liquidity reduces investors’ transaction costs and 
 
 176. Professors Bushee and Leuz studied a regulatory change, which became effective in 
1999, that mandated compliance with the Securities Exchange Act’s reporting requirements for 
firms on the OTC Bulletin Board. Bushee & Leuz, supra note 42. Their study found that firms 
already filing with the SEC prior to the rule change experienced “positive stock returns and 
permanent increases in [market] liquidity.” Id. at 233. This finding is consistent with the positive 
externalities from disclosure regulation. 
 177. See id. (finding that mandating firms on the OTC Bulletin Board to comply with the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 caused significant increases in market liquidity for the 
complying firms). 
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investment risks, thus lowering the corporation’s cost of capital.178 The 
second benefit is efficient pricing of the corporation’s securities. 
Efficient pricing prevents undervaluation and hence eliminates the 
risk of an unjustified takeover.179 It also provides an effective 
mechanism for measuring managerial efforts and compensation.180 
The third benefit is greater reduction in agency costs through 
improved monitoring and project choice181 and increased relational 
investments.182 
These effects represent a benefit only for efficient managements, 
however. For inefficient managements, full disclosure and a 
competitive information traders market represent threats. For these 
companies, a competitive information traders market will reflect 
inefficient management in lower stock prices, rendering the 
corporation a more likely target for takeovers;183 expose inefficient 
management to claims of breach of fiduciary duties;184 expose 
inefficient management to proxy fights;185 limit management’s ability 
to consume and expropriate value from shareholders; and increase 
pressure from the board of directors.186 
 
 178. See Douglas Diamond & Robert Verrecchia, Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of 
Capital, 46 J. FIN. 1325, 1326 (1991) (noting that increased disclosure leads to increased liquidity 
and lower cost of capital); David Easley & Maureen O’Hara, Information and the Cost of 
Capital 33 (Cornell Univ. Johnson Graduate Sch. of Mgmt. Working Paper, Nov. 2001) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=300715 (presenting a model 
showing that greater disclosure leads to lower cost of capital). 
 179. See Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 123 (Summer 1999) (“[R]equired disclosure can help alleviate the 
problem of poor investment projects much less expensively than hostile takeovers.”). 
 180. Venky Nagar et al., Discretionary Disclosure and Stock-Based Incentives, 34 J. ACCT. & 
ECON. 283 (2003), studied the relationship between managers’ disclosure activities and their 
stock price-based compensation incentives. The study found that disclosure by firms, measured 
both by management earnings forecast frequency and by analysts’ subjective ratings of 
disclosure practice, is positively related to the proportion of CEO compensation affected by 
stock price and to the value of shares held by the CEO. Id. at 307. 
 181. See Merritt B. Fox, The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in 
a Globalizing Market for Securities, 97 MICH. L. REV. 696, 732 (1998) (arguing that an 
appropriate level of issuer disclosure is essential to managerial motivation and to a firm’s choice 
of real investment projects). 
 182. See Diamond & Verrecchia, supra note 178, at 1325 (noting that increased disclosure 
leads to increased holdings of large investors). 
 183. See Fox, supra note 179, at 120 (“Greater disclosure . . . makes the hostile takeover 
threat more real.”). 
 184. Id. at 118. 
 185. Id. at 126. 
 186. Gordon, supra note 128, at 1131–32. 
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For these reasons, not all corporations should be expected to 
provide full disclosure without a mandatory disclosure rule.187 
Opponents of mandatory disclosure respond to these claims by 
arguing that under an elective disclosure system, investors will assume 
the worst about the nondisclosing firms and discount their 
securities.188 The assume-the-worst argument prompts several 
responses. First, because of the public-good nature of information, 
even efficient management may find the gains from full disclosure 
outweighed by the cost of the disclosure.189 In such cases, even 
efficient management will not disclose all available information about 
the corporation without a mandatory disclosure rule.190 Second, the 
ability of management to engage in management buyouts (MBO) 
transforms the market’s reaction to insufficient disclosure (i.e., 
discounting corporate securities) into a strategic tool that will 
improve management ability to buy out the corporation for 
discounted value.191 Third, management can avoid market discipline 
even if securities are discounted by relying on retained earnings 
instead of raising new capital, and adopting antitakeover defenses. 
All these responses, although valid, accept the premise that 
nondisclosing firms will be penalized by the market through excessive 
discounting of their securities prices. This is the core premise of the 
assume-the-worst argument. We provide a new response that rejects 
this premise and sheds additional light on the mandatory disclosure 
 
 187. See W.O. Jung & Young K. Kwon, Disclosure When the Market is Unsure of 
Information Endowment of Managers, 26 J. ACCT. RES. 146, 146 (1988) (suggesting that 
managers are more likely to disclose when they possess good news). 
 188. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 159, at 683; see also Thompson & King, supra note 
117 (applying this assumption to another context). 
 189. See Hal S. Scott, Internalization of Primary Public Securities Markets, 63 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 76 (Summer 2000) (noting that management sometimes chooses not to 
disclose “because disclosure would aid competitors”). 
 190. It is true that, in response to analyst demands, many managers do disclose much more 
information voluntarily than mandated by law. This could be because managers who want to 
disclose are not deterred by the externalities or because the basic mandated disclosure has 
already eroded the cost of externalities for all firms. 
 191. Managers do resort to such pre-MBO tactics. See David Millon, Why Is Corporate 
Management Obsessed with Quarterly Earnings and What Should Be Done About It?, 70 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 890, 911 (2002) (supplying evidence of management manipulation of 
discretionary accruals in the year preceding the public announcement of management’s 
intention to bid for control of the company); Susan E. Perry & Thomas H. Williams, Earnings 
Management Preceding Management Buyout Offers, 18 J. ACCT. & ECON. 157, 159 (1994) 
(finding “convincing evidence of manipulation . . . in the year preceding the public 
announcement” of the MBO bid). 
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debate. A competitive market of information traders cannot penalize 
firms that do not provide adequate disclosure by “assuming the 
worst” about them and excessively discounting their securities, 
because excessive discounting requires either asymmetric information 
that leads to a “lemons market,” or collusion among information 
traders. 
For asymmetric information to lead to a “lemons market,” the 
asymmetry should be between sellers and buyers.192 Nondisclosure by 
publicly traded corporations in the secondary market does not create 
asymmetric information between sellers (current shareholders) and 
buyers (potential shareholders); rather, both sides are in the dark. 
The corporation may avoid full disclosure for good reasons (e.g., to 
protect merger negotiations or valuable R&D results) or for bad 
reasons (e.g., to hide business failures or management abuses).193 In 
such a situation, both sides will attempt to find the true value of the 
corporation, leading to a market price that reflects their best estimate 
of the corporation’s value.194 Given the competition among sellers and 
among buyers, no one can simply “assume the worst,” and thus the 
market will not collapse into a “lemons market.”195 In other words, 
 
 192. A “lemons market” is a market in which asymmetric information exists between sellers and 
buyers. Since the buyers are not fully informed as to the quality of the products, they discount the 
price of all products. High quality products will not sell for a price that reflects their quality and will, 
thus, exit the market. Only “lemons” are left in the market. If producers of high quality products are 
unable to assure the buyers of their superior quality, they will be treated as “lemons.” See George 
Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality, Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 
488, 495 (1970) (“[T]he presence of people who wish to pawn bad wares as good wares tends to 
drive out the legitimate business.”); Hayne Leland, Quacks, Lemons and Licensing: A Theory of 
Minimum Quality Standards, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1328, 1239 (1979) (“[I]nformational asymmetry can 
lead to certain types of market failure.”). 
 193. See, e.g., Joshua Ronen & Varda (Lewinstein) Yaari, Incentives For Voluntary 
Disclosure, 5 J. FIN. MARKETS 349, 350–51 (2002) (arguing that typically, information with no 
duty to disclose consists of nonverifiable data, such as a predicted state of the environment; the 
absence of this type of information cannot be interpreted as bad news); R. Verrecchia, 
Discretionary Disclosure, 5 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179, 180–81 (1983) (discussing the two competing 
reasons for nondisclosure). 
 194. This is the setting of the seminal model showing wasteful information searches that was 
presented by Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to 
Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971). 
 195. Competition among analysts is most intense with respect to large corporations whose 
shares are being followed by many analysts. Yet, no individual analyst can discipline a major 
corporation whose shares are included in many investors’ portfolios by either discounting share 
prices by more than is necessary or by refusing to follow the shares. 
01__GOSHEN_PARCHOMOVSKY.DOC 8/22/2006  8:47 AM 
2006] SECURITIES REGULATION 763 
competitive forces negate the ability of the market to induce 
managements to provide full disclosure by punishing nondisclosure.196 
The only way information traders could overcome this problem 
is by collectively agreeing to assume the worst about nondisclosing 
corporations. Such an industry-wide agreement to punish 
corporations for nondisclosure would be a blatant violation of 
antitrust law.197 Even absent collusive tactics, if all information traders 
 
 196. Indeed, asymmetric information that can lead to a “lemons market” exists in the IPO 
market. When the corporation issues securities to the public, nondisclosure creates classic 
asymmetric information between a seller and buyers. In this case, the ability of the market to 
discount the price of the securities, and thereby provide the issuer with an adequate incentive to 
disclose, is high. See Alan Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 4 (noting that despite the range of relaxations in the IPO disclosure 
requirements, there is strong evidence that investor informational demands in securities 
offerings often compel issuers to disclose “at levels beyond that mandated—as a private, 
contractual matter”). Indeed, issuers attempt to avoid the “lemons market” by using 
underwriters, and underpricing the IPOs (sometimes heavily). See Seha M. Tinic, Anatomy of 
Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock, 43 J. FIN. 789, 797–800 (1988) (explaining the use of 
underpricing as a form of insurance). Why then is disclosure mandated in the IPO stage? The 
answer that flows out of our model is that disclosure at IPOs helps the secondary market. 
Immediately after the IPO, there will be trading between sellers and buyers in a competitive 
market, and until the first duty to disclose kicks in (which usually happens at the end of the first 
quarter of operation) there will be a period of time during which the secondary market will be 
in the dark. See Mingsheng Li et al., Asymmetric Information in the IPO Aftermarket, 40 FIN. 
REV. 131, 131 (2005) (finding that the greater the underpricing of an IPO, the lower the 
aggregate level of asymmetric information, and that the level of asymmetric information is 
lower immediately after the IPO comes to market compared with its level after a period of 
seasoning); Raghuram Rajan & Henri Servaes, Analyst Following of Initial Public Offerings, 52 
J. FIN. 507, 508 (1997) (finding that underpricing is positively related to the number of analysts 
who are covering the new issues in the IPO aftermarket). Indeed, in light of this view, the SEC 
policy of relaxing IPOs’ disclosure requirements and providing exemptions when there is no 
effect of asymmetric information in secondary trading is justified. For instance, private 
placement according to 144A allows trading only among institutional investors on a designated 
quoting system because there is minimal asymmetric information among these investors. See 
Palmiter, supra, at 29–85 (detailing all the relaxations in the IPO disclosure requirements and 
arguing that disclosure has become much less mandatory for IPOs). 
An alternative explanation is that there might be an adverse selection of investors in an 
IPO. Informed and sophisticated investors will avoid the IPO, but the issuer can still attract 
uninformed investors. Unlike secondary markets in which uninformed investors are protected 
by the presence of informed investors (i.e., the efficiency of the market), in an IPO there will be 
no protection. Thus, there is a need to mandate disclosure in IPOs to attract informed investors, 
avoid adverse selection problems, and thereby protect uninformed investors. 
 197. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning 
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 351 (2004) (acknowledging less obvious collusive 
practices “in some gatekeeping professions . . . most notably, auditing”); Butler D. Shaffer, In 
Restraint of Trade: Trade Associations and the Emergence of “Self Regulation,” 20 SW. U. L. 
REV. 289, 298–99 (1991) (noting the possible unlawfulness embedded in industry wide 
agreements regulating trade practices). 
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were to “assume the worst” and discount the shares too much, it 
would create an incentive for individual information traders to invest 
in search costs in an attempt to estimate the true value of the 
corporation. Such individual information traders would be able to buy 
for a low price (because at the time they buy, all other information 
traders discount the shares too much) and sell for a high price 
(because at the time they sell, the true facts will be revealed). All 
other information traders will be forced to respond by adopting a 
similar strategy and investing in search costs to form their own 
estimation of the true value of nondisclosing firms. Hence, 
competition among information traders will result in all information 
traders investing in search costs and forming their own individual 
estimates of the true value of nondisclosing corporations. Because the 
market cannot punish corporations for insufficient disclosure, it 
cannot spur inefficient management to fully disclose. Instead of 
voluntary optimal disclosure from corporations, the result, once 
again, is highly duplicative investments in search costs by information 
traders. Every noncooperative firm is thus impeding the development 
of a competitive market for information traders, leading to fewer 
information traders and less securities research. 
Indeed, once a competitive information traders market is 
developed, information traders will be able to generate the benefits 
associated with close analyst coverage, such as efficient pricing, 
liquidity, and better monitoring of agency costs. Good management 
seeking to capture these benefits will have an incentive to voluntarily 
engage in timely and fine-tuned disclosure. Even in a highly 
developed market, however, mandatory disclosure will remain 
necessary. First, because information traders face competition from 
other information traders, their ability to sanction nondisclosure is 
very limited. Only good managements that stand to benefit from 
analyst coverage will elect to disclose voluntarily, whereas other 
managements will disclose only if mandated by law.198 Second, 
information traders’ ability to obtain additional disclosure is 
predicated on the basic disclosure requirement embedded in 
mandatory disclosure and the legal sanctions for incomplete or 
misleading information. Third, many small corporations do not enjoy 
 
 198. But see Sharon Hannes, Comparisons Among Firms: (When) Do They Justify 
Mandatory Disclosure?, 29 J. CORP. L. 699 (2004) (arguing that many firms will disclose 
financial information even without mandatory disclosure to enjoy comparative disclosure 
benefits). 
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sufficient analyst coverage to generate the benefits that justify 
voluntary disclosure.199 Mandatory disclosure rules induce such 
disclosure by small corporations and corporations with bad 
management that would otherwise choose not to disclose. 
Finally, mandatory disclosure can be justified from the 
perspective of liquidity traders as well. At first glance, mandatory 
disclosure duties, insofar as they pertain to firm-specific information, 
may seem irrelevant to liquidity traders. The buying and selling 
decisions of liquidity traders are not based on information about 
individual stocks. Buying and holding a diversified portfolio shelters 
liquidity traders from the risks of mispricing. If in the absence of 
disclosure duties, some shares will be traded at a discount and others 
at a premium, then the holder of a diversified portfolio would receive 
the correct average price because the two opposing effects will cancel 
each other out. Even if one were to assume that absent disclosure 
duties, stock prices would be generally discounted or inflated, this 
should have no effect on liquidity traders who would then buy a 
portfolio for a discounted or inflated price and sell it for a 
correspondingly discounted or inflated price. Similarly, if the absence 
of disclosure duties increases firm-specific fundamental risk or noise 
risk, then buying and holding a portfolio will diversify away these 
risks. 
Note, however, that liquidity traders are concerned with 
securities regulation insofar as it facilitates liquidity and prevents 
shareholder expropriation. Mandatory disclosure has a positive effect 
on liquidity. The less disclosure there is, the higher the risk of 
asymmetric information. A higher risk of asymmetric information 
implies a larger bid-ask spread, and lower liquidity. Mandatory 
disclosure also reduces management agency costs, and with those the 
risk of shareholder expropriation. Indeed, both risks—asymmetric 
information and agency costs—cannot be diversified by liquidity 
traders, although liquidity traders can discount overall share prices. 
This action will increase the cost of capital for all corporations and 
 
 199. See Ravi Bhushan, Firm Characteristics and Analyst Following, 11 J. ACCT. & ECON. 
255, 256–57 (1989) (examining factors that lead to differences in analysts’ following of firms, and 
concluding that firm size, among other things, influences supply and demand of analysts’ 
coverage); Mark H. Lang et al., Concentrated Control, Analyst Following, and Valuation: Do 
Analysts Matter Most When Investors Are Protected Least?, 42 J. ACCT. RES. 589, 590 (2004) 
(reporting empirical findings indicating that “analyst coverage is negatively related to the 
overall level of family/management control of a firm and to whether the family/management 
group is the largest controlling blockholder of a firm”). 
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reduce allocative efficiency. Mandatory disclosure avoids this chain of 
actions, thereby promoting allocative efficiency. 
B. Fraud-on-the-Market Theory Revisited 
One of the more important modern developments in securities 
regulation is the adoption of the fraud-on-the-market theory as a 
rebuttable presumption of reliance in securities fraud cases. In a 
common law fraud case the plaintiff must show that there was a 
misstatement200 issued by the defendant with scienter,201 and that the 
plaintiff relied on the misstatement202 and suffered damages.203 To 
show reliance means to show that the plaintiff read the misstatement 
and acted based upon it.204 Such a showing in a securities fraud will of 
course differ among investors: some read the misstatement and acted 
upon it; others read it and took no action;205 still others did not read 
the misstatement but took independent action. Of course, there are 
also those who did not even know about the misstatement. If, in a 
class action, one had to show reliance, then the individual issues 
would predominate over the common ones and the class could not be 
certified.206 To facilitate class actions in securities fraud cases, courts 
have adopted FOTM as a presumption of reliance.207 Because the 
market incorporates information into prices, it will reflect the 
misstatement in the securities price, and thus reliance on market 
prices is a substitute for reliance on the misstatement.208 
Consequently, even those who did not know about the misstatement 
 
 200. Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1043 (11th Cir. 1986) 
 201. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976); LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 949–61 (4th ed. 2001). 
 202. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 201, at 1200–10. 
 203. Id. at 1210–19. 
 204. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462–63 (2d Cir. 1965) (discussing the 
requirement of reliance in civil cases under Rule 10b-5). 
 205. See Gochnauer v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 810 F.2d 1042, 1051 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 206. The requirement that common issues dominate individual issues in a class action 
lawsuit comes from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2), 23(b)(3). 
 207. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906–08 (9th Cir. 1975) (eliminating the 
requirement of proving direct reliance). 
 208. See Gebhardt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824, 831 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that 
plaintiffs typically fulfill the transaction causation pleading requirement simply by pleading that 
defendants perpetrated a fraud on the market as a whole). 
01__GOSHEN_PARCHOMOVSKY.DOC 8/22/2006  8:47 AM 
2006] SECURITIES REGULATION 767 
but traded during the relevant time of the misstatement are entitled 
to sue.209 
Although many supported the adoption of the FOTM 
presumption,210 the theory has been under attack since its inception.211 
First, based on the dissent in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson212—the Supreme 
Court case that adopted the presumption—commentators argued that 
markets are not efficient enough to justify the presumption.213 If the 
market is inefficient, and thus does not respond to the misstatement, 
there is no reason to adopt the FOTM presumption. This attack has 
been recently revived with the growth of behavioral finance and the 
 
 209. See Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 415 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that to invoke 
the presumption a plaintiff need only show that the securities at issue traded on an efficient 
market). 
 210. See Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created the Market: An Unwise and Unwarranted Extension 
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 369 (1995) (noting the vast extent 
to which Fraud-On-The-Market theory has been commended). 
 211. See Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases 
Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. L. 1, 11 (1982) (arguing that a presumption of 
reliance should be abandoned); Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action 
Under the Federal Securities Laws—The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 972–
73 (1994) (“Defendants complain that they are victims of an epidemic of baseless litigation that 
confuses stock market volatility with securities fraud and that creates substantial liability for 
companies that provide projections to the market.”). 
 212. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 213. In his Basic dissent, Justice White noted that 
[W]hile the economists’ theories which underpin the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption may have the appeal of mathematical exactitude and scientific certainty, 
they are—in the end—nothing more than theories which may or may not prove 
accurate upon further consideration. . . . Thus, while the majority states that, for 
purposes of reaching its result it need only make modest assumptions about the way 
in which ‘market professionals generally’ do their jobs, and how the conduct of 
market professionals affects stock prices . . . I doubt that we are in much of a position 
to assess which theories aptly describe the functioning of the securities industry. 
Id. at 254–55 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Ian Ayres, Back to 
Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945, 967 (1991) 
(describing the increased attack on the efficient markets hypothesis); Carol R. Goforth, The 
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis—An Inadequate Justification for the Fraud-On-The-Market 
Presumption, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 895, 910–11 (1992) (introducing the Basic Court’s 
introduction of the efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH) into legal doctrine and its 
rationale for doing so); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad 
Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-On-The-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1077–91 
(1990) (noting that the efficiency of markets differs with respect to different pieces of 
information); Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons From Financial Economics: Materiality, 
Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1991) 
(noting that substantial disagreement exists among financial economists about what conclusions 
empirical tests of market efficiency support). 
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burst of the high-tech bubble.214 Second, it was argued that even when 
markets are efficient, the adoption of the presumption is not justified 
because it creates overdeterrence,215 provides damages to 
nondamaged parties,216 and distorts productive efficiency.217 
1. The Inefficient Market Claim.  The first criticism of the 
FOTM presumption suffers from two flaws. First, it relies on an 
incorrect reading of the ruling in Basic. Second, our analysis indicates 
that when markets are effective, yet deviate from efficient pricing, 
FOTM is especially important. We start with the first flaw. The 
majority in Basic famously stated that one must show “reliance on the 
integrity of the market price” as a precondition for invoking the 
FOTM presumption.218 There are two ways to interpret this 
 
 214. See, e.g., Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Market Indeterminacy, 28 J. CORP. L. 517, 518–19 
(2003) (chronicling the history of uncertainty regarding the stock market’s efficiency); Ferrillo 
et al., supra note 28, at 107–16 (describing the various challenges to the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis); M.C. Findlay & E.E. Williams, A Fresh Look at the Efficient Market Hypothesis: 
How the Intellectual History of Finance Encouraged a Real “Fraud-On-The-Market,” 23 J. POST 
KEYNESIAN ECON. 181. 181–82 (2001) (postulating that evidence supporting the efficient 
market hypothesis was in fact never very strong). 
 215. Janet C. Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Action, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
1487, 1495 (1996); Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 643 (1996); John A. MacKerron, The Price Integrity Cause of Action 
Under Rule 10b-5: Limiting and Extending the Use of the Fraud On The Market Theory, 69 OR. 
L. REV. 177, 177–78 (1990); Mahoney, supra note 5, at 626–41. 
 216. Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing With Reliance 
Requirements In Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435, 460 (1984); Frank 
Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 642 
(1985); Langevoort, supra note 215, at 646. See Michael Y. Scudder, The Implications of Market-
Based Damages Caps in Securities Class Action, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 435, 442, 465 (1997) 
(describing the windfall nature of securities damages in FOTM class action lawsuits following 
the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995). 
 217. See Marcel Kahan, Games, Lies, and Securities Fraud, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 761 
(1992) (noting that the FOTM presumption allows companies to be subjected to liability for 
competitory and negotiatory lies); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Fraud on the 
Market Theory Revisited, 77 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1015 (1991) (arguing that securities fraud liability 
may destroy company’s property interest in information); Charles H. Steen, The Econometrics 
of Fraud-On-The-Market Securities Fraud, 4 J.L. ECON. 11, 36–37 (1994) (arguing against the 
effect of withholding investors from placing their capital at risk, which in turn would induce the 
market’s process of efficiently allocating resources to their best use). 
 218. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 226 (“We must also determine whether a person who traded a 
corporation’s shares on a securities exchange after the issuance of a materially misleading 
statement by the corporation may invoke a rebuttable presumption that, in trading, he relied on 
the integrity of the price set by the market.”); id. at 249–50 (“[I]t is not inappropriate to apply a 
presumption of reliance supported by the fraud-on-the-market theory.”). 
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statement.219 The first, putting the premium on the term “price,” 
requires that plaintiffs who seek to invoke the presumption must 
show that they accepted the market price as an accurate reflection of 
value. Under this interpretation, integrity of market price is 
synonymous with accurate pricing. The second interpretation, 
emphasizing the term “market,” does not require the plaintiff to show 
reliance on the accuracy of the price, but rather focuses on the 
integrity of the process by which the market sets prices. That is, the 
second interpretation requires a showing of what we call an effective 
market—a market with a corrective price mechanism. 
To understand the difference between the two interpretations, 
consider a case of short selling. Under the first interpretation, 
plaintiffs who sold short cannot invoke the FOTM presumption 
because the act of selling short, by definition, indicates that they did 
not consider the market price an accurate reflection of value.220 The 
second interpretation leads to a radically different result. Although 
selling short indicates that the seller was of the opinion that the 
security was overpriced, the decision to sell does not demonstrate that 
the seller deemed the market ineffective. On the contrary, a short 
seller must rely on the effectiveness of the market, because the 
profitability of selling short is premised on the belief that the price 
would eventually revert to value. A careful reading of the majority’s 
opinion in Basic reveals that the second interpretation is the correct 
one.221 The first interpretation is the product of substituting for a 
 
 219. For an excellent analysis of Basic and its interpretations, see Donald C. Langevoort, 
Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. 
REV. 851, 903 (1992); see also Note, Recent Cases: Tort Law—Indirect Reliance—New Jersey 
Supreme Court Rejects Fraud-On-The-Market Theory—Kaufman v. i-start Corp., 754 A.2d 1188 
(N.J. 2000), 114 HARV. L. REV. 2550, 2553 (2001) (noting the distinction between two 
informational efficiency and fundamental efficiency aspects of the ECMH: “informational 
efficiency means that stock prices will reflect certain classes of existing information,” whereas 
“fundamental efficiency posits that, conditioned on the information available, stock prices will 
reflect the present value of corporations’ expected underlying profits”). 
 220. The short-seller example was provided by the minority in Basic, 485 U.S. at 251, and 
ruled on in Zlotnick v. TIE Communications, 836 F.2d 818, 824 (3d Cir. 1988) (a short-seller is 
not entitled to the presumption of reliance). 
 221. This conclusion is apparent from the example that the majority in Basic provides for 
rebutting the presumption of reliance: 
For example, a plaintiff who believed that Basic’s statements were false and that 
Basic was indeed engaged in merger discussions, and who consequently believed that 
Basic stock was artificially underpriced, but sold his shares nevertheless because of 
other unrelated concerns, e.g., potential antitrust problems, or political pressures to 
divest from shares of certain businesses, could not be said to have relied on the 
integrity of a price he knew had been manipulated. 
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direct reading of the Basic majority view the minority’s misreading of 
the majority view.222 
If one accepts the first interpretation, the question of whether 
markets are efficient is relevant to the adoption of the FOTM 
presumption. Indeed, those attacking the presumption on the grounds 
of market inefficiency contend that Basic supports the first 
interpretation.223 If, however, the correct reading of Basic is as we 
argue, then the issue of efficiency does not affect the validity of the 
presumption,224 because the presumption only requires a showing of 
an effective, not efficient, market.225 
As for the second flaw, our model shows that when markets are 
effective but inefficient it is especially desirable to provide optimal 
conditions to information traders, because information traders 
constitute the best mechanism for correcting market inefficiencies. 
 
Basic, 485 U.S. at 249. Clearly, this is a unique example. It requires that the investor knew of the 
true facts and was forced to trade due to very rare reasons (“potential antitrust problems, or 
political pressures”). Why does the investor have to know the true facts? Is it not enough just to 
think that the stock is overpriced? Why does the sale have to be forced? Langevoort, supra note 
219, at 857 n.156. Why not use the much simpler example of a short seller provided by the 
minority? Because the majority does not accept the interpretation that reliance on the integrity 
of the market price requires accepting the price as the true value of the security. Indeed, in In re 
Western Union Securities Litigation, 120 F.R.D. 629, 637 (D.N.J. 1988), the court found 
Zlotnick’s validity “somewhat questionable in light of Basic.” Similarly, in Deutschman v. 
Beneficial Corp., 132 F.R.D. 359, 371 (D. Del. 1990), the court held that, although options 
traders are betting on price movements, they are entitled to the presumption of reliance. For 
scholars supporting this interpretation, see, for example, Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital 
Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 918–22 
(1989); Langevoort, supra note 219, at 857 & n.156. 
 222. See Justice Byron White’s description of the majority’s opinion. Basic, 485 U.S. at 255–
56 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White provided the following 
examples for rebutting the reliance presumption: 
[A] plaintiff who decides, months in advance of an alleged misrepresentation, to 
purchase a stock; one who buys or sells a stock for reasons unrelated to its price; one 
who actually sells a stock “short” days before the misrepresentation is made—surely 
none of these people can state a valid claim under Rule 10b-5. 
Id. at 251 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). These examples are based on the 
fact that the investor did not accept the price as a true reflection of value. For scholars 
supporting this interpretation, see, for example, Jonathan R. Macey, The Fraud on the Market 
Theory: Some Preliminary Issues, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 923, 925–26 (1989). 
 223. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 222, at 225–26. 
 224. “By accepting this rebuttable presumption, we do not intend conclusively to adopt any 
particular theory of how quickly and completely publicly available information is reflected in 
market price.” Basic, 485 U.S. at 249 n.28. 
 225. “For purposes of accepting the presumption of reliance in this case, we need only 
believe that market professionals generally consider most publicly announced material 
statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices.” Id. at 247 n.24. 
01__GOSHEN_PARCHOMOVSKY.DOC 8/22/2006  8:47 AM 
2006] SECURITIES REGULATION 771 
Effective and efficient markets imply the existence of a sufficiently 
competitive market for information traders, which is beating noise 
traders and capable of producing accurate pricing. In such a market, 
information traders already enjoy low verification costs, which the 
FOTM presumption protects. On the other hand, when markets are 
effective and inefficient the implication is that information traders 
cannot effectively correct market prices because of increased noise 
trading and limitations on arbitrage. In such a market, the probability 
of profiting from misstatements is high because noise traders would 
amplify the effect of misstatements on price and information traders 
would not be able to prevent price fluctuations. Under these 
conditions, information traders are exposed to high risk (low 
likelihood of capturing price or value deviations and large potential 
damages) and must bear very high verification cost, leading to limited 
price correction activity. Abolishing the FOTM presumption would 
further increase the probability of fraudulent statements, making it 
even harder for information traders to spot and correct deviations of 
price from value. Thus, in an effective but inefficient market, it is 
imperative to employ the FOTM presumption to increase information 
traders’ activity and thereby more swiftly return to efficiency.226 
2. The Efficient Market Claims.  The second attack on the 
FOTM presumption stems from the opposite assumption—that 
markets are efficient. Assume, therefore, that the market is efficient 
and does reflect misstatements in price. To deter misstatements, the 
offender should be forced to pay the damage created by the 
misstatement multiplied by a factor that takes account of the fact that 
the probability of capture is lower than one. The argument is that 
because the only damage from misstatements is precaution costs, the 
use of the FOTM presumption excessively penalizes violators.227 
Overcompensation results when all investors trading in the market 
are compensated, including liquidity traders who randomly traded 
while prices reflected the misstatement. Liquidity traders, however, 
do not invest in precautionary measures because they do not invest in 
information; nor do they suffer directly from misstatements. If fraud 
randomly distorts prices, then buying and selling a portfolio should 
 
 226. Here we do not address the question of the appropriate damage measure, as it deserves 
a separate discussion. 
 227. See Mahoney, supra note 5, at 625, 626–41 (discussing fraud in secondary securities 
markets). 
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cancel out the effects of fraud.228 Moreover, even if fraud leads to an 
overall inflation or deflation in the market, liquidity traders will not 
be harmed because they will buy and sell portfolios for similarly 
inflated or deflated prices.229 Thus, the argument goes, compensating 
liquidity traders gives them a windfall and overcharges the offender. 
Moreover, the argument posits that due to the overdeterrence, 
management will reduce the amount of voluntary disclosure it 
provides to the market, thereby decreasing the free information 
available to information traders.230 Instead of releasing information to 
the market as management receives it without verification, 
management will release only a limited amount of verified 
information. The substitution of reduced verification costs (disclosing 
limited amount of verified information) for reduced search costs 
(disclosing large amounts of unverified information) is harmful to 
information traders because it is much more costly to information 
traders to discover new pieces of firm-specific information than it is to 
verify disclosed pieces of information. Overdeterrence leading to a 
limited amount of voluntary information will thus increase the costs 
for information traders because they will have to invest in searching 
rather than in verification. 
a. The Current Responses.  Several responses have been offered 
to the foregoing argument. The first is that sometimes fraud increases 
the risk of buying a portfolio in an inflated market and selling it in a 
deflated market. This is a risk that cannot be diversified and liquidity 
traders will respond to it by reducing the amount of their trading or 
by discounting stock prices in general.231 Both actions are harmful. 
Reduced liquidity is harmful to liquidity traders, and discounted 
prices are harmful to corporations raising capital.232 Although this 
argument is theoretically solid, in practice it is highly unlikely that the 
cumulative effect of individual frauds will affect markets in a way that 
will increase the probability of buying in an inflated market and 
selling in a deflated market.233 
 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 650–55. 
 231. Georgakopoulos, supra note 57, at 702–11; A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A 
Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 
925, 938–40 (1999). 
 232. Georgakopoulos, supra note 57, at 702–11; Pritchard, supra note 231, at 945. 
 233. Georgakopoulos, supra note 57, at 702–11; Pritchard, supra note 231, at 940–941. 
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A variation on this response does not focus on fraud increasing 
undiversifiable risk. Rather, it argues that, although liquidity traders 
do not invest based on information, they do care about information 
insofar as it affects liquidity.234 That is, liquidity traders care about 
transaction costs in the form of high bid-ask spreads. The presence of 
misstatements creates opportunities for asymmetric information, as 
information traders investing in precautions will have greater 
likelihood of discovering misstatements. Greater information 
asymmetries will cause market makers to increase the bid-ask spread. 
Accordingly, even if liquidity traders buy and hold a portfolio they 
will still bear the cost of high bid-ask spreads. Although this argument 
has merit, it does not explain why liquidity traders receive 
compensation in FOTM cases. Compensating information traders 
alone will reduce information traders’ incentive to invest in 
precautions, thereby reducing asymmetric information. In other 
words, if it is the behavior of information traders that can either 
amplify or diminish the problem, why not compensate only 
information traders? Indeed, the conclusion of this argument is that 
private enforcement relying on the FOTM presumption should be 
replaced with public enforcement by the stock exchanges.235 
A different response admits that the FOTM presumption creates 
a windfall for liquidity traders, but argues that nevertheless it does 
not overdeter. Because fraud requires scienter and is therefore a 
culpable offense, there is nothing wrong with imposing punitive 
damages on offenders.236 Critics of this response point out that it fails 
to recognize that, in practice, the class action mechanism employed in 
securities cases does not distinguish between negligent and fraudulent 
misstatements.237 As a result, vis-à-vis potentially negligent (rather 
 
 234. Georgakopoulos, supra note 57, at 703–07. 
 235. See Pritchard, supra note 231, at 938–40 (discussing the social costs of fraud on 
liquidity). 
 236. See Marilyn F. Johnson et al., In re Silicon Graphics, Inc.: Shareholder Wealth Effects 
Resulting From the Interpretation of the Private Litigation Reform Act’s Pleading Standard, 73 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 773, 781 (2000) (“[T]he corporation being sued neither bought nor sold its 
securities and, accordingly, did not gain from the fraud. Nonetheless, fraud on the market suits 
allow investors to recover their losses from the corporation based on its managers’ 
misstatements . . . . Thus, class actions are a potential punitive sanction that should provide a 
substantial deterrent to fraud.”). 
 237. See Kevin R. Johnson, Liability for Reckless Misrepresentations and Omissions under 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 667, 674–75 (1991) 
(“[C]ourts have been less than precise in defining what exactly constitutes a reckless 
misrepresentation . . . . The result is that actual and potential parties to Section 10(b) and Rule 
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than fraudulent) offenders, the use of the FOTM presumption does 
result in overdeterrence. We note, however, that some argue that the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 has improved the 
functioning of class actions, resulting in better correlation between 
fraud and liability both in courts and in private settlements.238 Indeed, 
if courts could accurately identify all cases of fraud (consistently 
exempting negligent managements) and award accurate 
compensation in all those cases, the problem of overdeterrence would 
disappear. 
b. The Proposed Model’s Responses.  We now draw on our 
market model to provide new justifications for the FOTM 
presumption. In the following discussion, we begin by highlighting the 
full range of harms fraudulent statements impose on financial 
markets. We show that in addition to precaution costs, fraud increases 
liquidity costs and exacerbates management agency costs. We then 
explain how the FOTM presumption helps information traders 
mitigate those costs. Second, we analyze the effect of the FOTM 
presumption on voluntary disclosure of information by firms. We 
conclude that there is no reason to assume that managements will 
respond to the FOTM doctrine by reducing disclosure. Finally, we 
discuss the appropriate liability standard in fraud cases. We submit 
that although in theory negligence outperforms scienter, in the real 
world, where litigation is driven by class actions, it makes sense to 
require scienter. 
 
10b-5 actions cannot predict with any degree of certainty how a trier of fact will characterize 
challenged conduct and thus whether it may serve as the basis for liability. Nor can actors in 
securities transactions ensure that they take the steps necessary to minimize the potential for 
liability.”); Johnson et al., supra note 236, at 782–83 (noting the vagueness of the scienter 
criterion). 
 238. See, e.g., David S. Escoffery, Note, A Winning Approach to Loss Causation Under Rule 
10B-5 in Light of the Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1781, 1782–
83 (2000) (discussing the effect of the Act on courts’ approaches to loss causation); Jeffrey L. 
Oldham, Taking “Efficient Markets” Out of the Fraud-On-The-Market Doctrine After the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1030 (2003) (discussing the effects of 
the Act on FOTM presumption); Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 947–50 (noting that there is statistically significant 
evidence, however, that suggests that the Act improved overall case quality at least in the circuit 
that most strictly interprets one of the Act’s key provisions); Elliott J. Weiss, Complex Litigation 
At the Millennium: Pleading Securities Fraud, 64 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5–9 
(Spring/Summer 2001) (describing the positive effects of the Act upon the filing of frivolous 
class action lawsuits). 
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i. Full Range of Damages.  Our model offers a superior 
justification for the FOTM presumption by focusing on the pricing 
process of the market. As a starting point, we emphasize that without 
the FOTM presumption, a plaintiff in a fraud case must show both 
reliance on the misstatement and actual trading in shares affected by 
the manipulation. Not all information traders trade, however. Some 
information traders trade directly, such as institutional investors or 
money management entities, whereas others, especially analysts, sell 
investment advice to third parties who do the trading. Still other 
analysts disclose their product to the market for free, allowing noise 
traders to trade based on this information. Although there may be 
inappropriate incentives to sue when the plaintiff’s holding is 
significant, information traders who trade can sue and prove reliance. 
On the other hand, information traders who do not directly trade fail 
to satisfy the precondition of a trade and thus will be barred from 
bringing a suit. Moreover, all other investors who rely on the analysts’ 
product and traded will, as well, be barred from bringing a suit 
because they will not be able to show reliance on the misstatement—
even though the analytical product was affected by it. This implies 
that, to protect the value of the analyst’s product, the FOTM 
presumption must apply to all traders who rely on the analytical 
product. Indeed, aside from the general difficulty of distinguishing 
types of traders, it remains puzzling why liquidity traders receive 
compensation. To resolve this puzzle, it is imperative to realize that 
the harm from fraud is not restricted to precaution costs. Fraud 
inflicts additional harms in the form of higher liquidity costs and 
increased management agency costs. 
Consider liquidity costs first. Fraud engenders asymmetric 
information and thus increases precaution costs for information 
traders. As a result, when fraud is pervasive, the number of 
information traders drops and competition among them diminishes. 
Reduced competition among information traders increases the risk 
faced by market makers, who then increase the bid-ask spread to 
reflect the higher probability of fraud. The FOTM presumption helps 
liquidity traders recover their losses. Because it gives them the right 
to receive compensation, the FOTM presumption prompts liquidity 
traders to maintain their volume of trading and avoid discounting 
overall prices. Neglecting to compensate for these damages will not 
adequately deter misstatements. 
Moreover, even if information traders and those who rely on 
their analytical products are compensated, information traders will 
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still be harmed if liquidity traders are not compensated. High bid-ask 
spreads and reduced trading by liquidity traders will erode 
information traders’ potential profits. 
Fraud inflicts yet another harm in the form of increased 
management agency costs.239 Management’s incentives to issue 
misstatements are related to the quality of the corporate business 
operation and management’s pursuit of personal benefits. 
Management might lie to avoid disclosing mismanagement or theft, to 
increase its compensation through manipulation of share prices, to 
generate profits through insider trading, or to facilitate issuing new 
shares for inflated prices. These activities create substantial 
management agency costs: they decrease corporate assets and 
dissipate the corporation’s value, distort efficient allocation of capital, 
and frustrate the efficient operation of markets by harming 
information traders and liquidity traders. The greater the likelihood 
of fraud, the greater the potential for increased management agency 
costs. The management agency costs are borne by all other market 
participants: information traders, liquidity traders, and noise traders. 
If management agency costs are significant, investors will discount 
overall prices, increasing the cost of capital for all corporations. 
Moreover, the increased likelihood of fraud will further decrease the 
effectiveness with which information traders monitor management. 
This too will reduce the efficiency of the market and further increase 
the cost of capital. The FOTM presumption facilitates the filing of 
class actions, increases the likelihood of detection, and provides 
compensation for the whole range of damages resulting from fraud. 
Improved deterrence boosts information traders’ activity, which in 
turn further reduces management agency costs.240 
ii. Verification Cost Versus Search Cost?  Our analysis also 
demonstrates that the argument that the FOTM presumption will 
lead management to decrease voluntary disclosure and thereby raise 
information traders’ search costs is incorrect. Management disclosure 
decisions are shaped by two competing threats: liability for inaccurate 
 
 239. See Pritchard, supra note 231, at 937–38 (examining the costs of reduced managerial 
accountability). 
 240. We do not address the question of whether liability should be imposed on the 
individual managers as opposed to the corporation itself. This question is analyzed in an 
excellent article by Professors Arlen & Carrey, supra note 149, who support the imposition of 
liability on managers. 
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disclosure and liability for nondisclosure. Although liability for 
nondisclosure is limited, there is no reason to assume that 
managements will respond to the FOTM doctrine by reducing 
disclosure. Because the risk of overdeterrence only applies to honest 
(although potentially negligent) management and not to dishonest 
management, it is an empirical question whether management will 
resort to defensive overdisclosure or underdisclosure. Indeed, one 
empirical study of the effects of the endorsement of the FOTM 
doctrine found both that there was an increase in voluntary disclosure 
of bad news and that companies with bad news warned investors on a 
more timely basis.241 
Moreover, management discloses more information than 
mandated by securities regulation because information traders create 
demand for information. As information traders wield more influence 
over firms, they will be able to induce more fine-tuned and timely 
disclosure. True, information traders cannot prevent management 
from reducing the level of disclosure. But overdeterrence is irrelevant 
to inefficient managements that lack incentives to disclose in the first 
place; it only applies to efficient management that wishes to disclose 
information. Efficient management that chooses to reduce disclosure 
runs the risk of losing all the benefits that accrue from analyst 
coverage, such as accurate pricing, liquidity, and reduced agency 
costs. Again, it is an empirical question whether the loss of these 
benefits outweighs the overdeterrence effect and thus negates the 
incentive to underdisclose.242 
iii. The Appropriate Standard of Review under Class Action.  A 
different overdeterrence argument maintains that, although in theory 
courts are supposed to apply a scienter standard in cases of fraud, in 
 
 241. Given that the study found no change in the behavior of companies with good news, 
the findings support the view that FOTM doctrine did not reduce voluntary disclosure, but the 
other way around. Sunil Dutta & Jacob Nelson, Shareholder Litigation and Market 
Information: Effects of the Endorsement of the Fraud-on-the-market Doctrine on Market 
Information (March 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=69036. Other studies support the same conclusion. See 
Jennifer Francis et al., Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Disclosures, 1994 J. ACCT. RES. 
137, 137–40 (finding that while disclosure does not deter litigation it may reduce the severity of 
litigation); Douglas Skinner, Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News, 1994 J. ACCT. RES. 38, 
38–39 (1994) (finding that firms facing large negative earnings surprises are more likely to make 
preemptive earnings-related disclosures). 
 242. Id. 
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practice they apply a negligence standard.243 Consequently, plaintiffs 
can collect damages even from corporations that are not guilty of 
fraud or recklessness.244 In response to the overcompensation 
problem, some scholars have argued for the abolition of the FOTM 
presumption, and with it the class action mechanism. 
Although we do not dispute that courts at times mistakenly apply 
a negligence standard in fraud cases, we argue that negligence may in 
fact be the appropriate standard in this case. Relative to a scienter 
rule, a negligence rule has several effects: (a) increasing the number 
of lawsuits filed; (b) lowering the cost of judicial decisionmaking; (c) 
increasing verification costs for the corporation; (d) reducing 
verification costs for information traders; and (e) delaying disclosure 
of information to the market. We next elaborate on each effect. 
We begin our analysis with the number of lawsuits. Given that a 
scienter rule sets a higher bar for successful suits relative to 
negligence, one would expect an increase in the number of filings 
under a negligence regime. Furthermore, a negligence rule also 
lowers the cost of litigation, as it requires plaintiffs to prove (and 
courts to adjudicate) violations of an objective standard of the duty of 
care, compared with a scienter rule that requires proof of willfulness 
or recklessness. 
Insofar as verification costs are concerned, a negligence regime 
embodies a tradeoff between expenditures on verification by firms 
and investment in verification by information traders.245 From the 
standpoint of corporations, a negligence rule raises verification costs. 
Relative to scienter, negligence forces management to take more 
precautions to verify the accuracy of the information that it discloses 
to the market. Accordingly, management will spend more resources 
verifying information before releasing it to the market. In contrast, a 
negligence regime will effect a cost savings for information traders 
because the added investment in verification by corporations will 
eliminate some of the verification efforts undertaken by information 
traders. But the two effects will not necessarily cancel each other out. 
 
 243. See Johnson et al., supra note 236, at 782–83 (noting that the scienter standard is 
notoriously amorphous). Although the scienter standard is somewhat more stringent than 
negligence, even in theory it is difficult to say how much more, and it is nearly impossible in 
practice. 
 244. See, e.g, Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727, 742–43 (1995) 
(supplying evidence indicating that between 22 percent and 60 percent of securities suits are 
settled for nuisance value). 
 245. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 302–13 (3d ed. 2000). 
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Savings for information traders will likely outweigh added verification 
costs for the corporation. First, as we explained, managers, as 
insiders, can verify information more cost-effectively than 
information traders. Second, because all information traders invest in 
verification costs, the added investment by the corporation eliminates 
duplicative investment for the information traders.246 
As for the timing of disclosure, a negligence regime should be 
expected to cause some delay in the release of information to the 
market. The delay is due to the fact that management might need to 
spend more time verifying the information before it releases it to the 
public. Because the information that information traders receive from 
firms will be more accurate and the verification process shorter, the 
delay in disclosure on the corporations’ side will likely be offset by 
speedier pricing. 
How do these effects net out? It seems that the benefits from 
imposing additional verification duties on corporations outweigh the 
costs associated with a negligence regime. A negligence rule 
substitutes duplicative verification investments by information traders 
for a single and cheaper verification investment by the corporation. 
Because the corporation is the least cost avoider, efficiency prescribes 
imposing the cost of avoidance on the corporation.247 The negligence 
rule balances between the precautions taken by corporations and 
those taken by information traders. It reflects the fact that there are 
misstatements that the corporation can more cost-effectively prevent 
and misstatements that information traders can more easily detect. 
But if a negligence standard is indeed superior to scienter, why 
not modify the Securities Exchange Act to specifically provide for a 
negligence standard? We do not support such a change. Because 
experience teaches that courts sometimes overenforce the statutory 
standard (e.g., by sometimes imposing liability based on negligence 
instead of scienter), lowering the statutory standard to negligence 
might generate a tidal wave of strike suits. The enactment of a 
negligence standard coupled with the retaining of the class action 
mechanism might cause a slide toward a strict liability standard. In 
theory, a strict liability regime would force corporations to invest in 
precautions that would eliminate all misstatements while relieving 
 
 246. It should be emphasized, however, that there are misstatements that it will be easier for 
the information traders to detect relative to the corporation. Otherwise strict liability should be 
the norm. 
 247. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 245, 306–11. 
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information traders of the need to take any precautions whatsoever.248 
Given that some misstatements may be detected more cost-effectively 
by information traders, such a one-sided regime would be clearly 
excessive. Moreover, the imposition of a strict liability regime would 
not completely eliminate all verification costs in practice, as some 
information traders might wish to spearhead class actions against 
corporations that failed to meet the heightened standard. Worst of all, 
the number of frivolous suits under a strict liability regime would be 
very high and both corporations and the courts would incur 
significant expenses dealing with such suits. 
The high-scienter standard of review achieves an efficient 
balance because the agency cost problems embodied in the class 
action mechanism249 ensure that the actual standard will slide to the 
appropriate level—negligence.250 First, this balance preserves the use 
of private enforcement and its deterrent effects without 
overburdening the corporations. Indeed, one empirical study shows 
that the most important element in a successful system of securities 
regulation is the existence of private enforcement.251 Second, although 
the legal enforcement achieved by blurring the distinction between 
scienter and negligence underdeters fraud, on the one hand, and 
occasionally awards undeserved damages, on the other, the market 
provides the additional sanction needed for appropriately deterring 
fraud. Apart from the settlement payment, corporations guilty of 
fraud must also bear the more important sanction of a drop in share 
price.252 Indeed, the market judges the merits of private law suits 
 
 248. Id. at 302–04. 
 249. John C. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic 
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 669, 673–77 (1986). 
 250. On the balance between procedure and evidence on the one hand, and the substantive 
liability standard in achieving optimal deterrence in enforcement, see Richard A. Bierschbach & 
Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J., No. 6, 1–5 (forthcoming 2005), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/workshop-papers/Stein.pdf. 
 251. Rafael La-Porta et al., What Works in Securities Law? at 21–22 (Tuck Sch. of Bus., 
Working Paper No. 03-22, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=425880. 
 252. Dale O. Cloninger & Edward Waller, Corporate Fraud, Systematic Risk, and 
Shareholder Enrichment, 29 J. SOCIO-ECON. 189, 189 (2000) (noting that the size of the share 
price reactions following the disclosure of illegal activity generally exceeds the actual fines, fees 
and penalties that the firms eventually experience). 
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against corporations by adjusting share prices and thereby provides 
more fine-tuned deterrence against fraud.253 
In sum, the FOTM presumption is an essential legal tool that 
facilitates the development of a market for information traders and 
reduces precaution costs, liquidity costs, and management agency 
costs. The FOTM presumption improves the effectiveness of the 
market and leads to improved efficiency and liquidity. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have provided a general theory that explains 
how securities regulation promotes efficient and liquid markets. We 
demonstrated that the essential role of securities regulation is to 
facilitate and maintain a competitive market for information traders. 
Of the various groups of investors operating in the financial market, 
information traders are best suited to provide the financial market 
with accurate pricing and adequate liquidity. Recognizing this fact, 
securities regulation elects to create market conditions that would 
enable information traders to perform these tasks. The ban on insider 
trading shields information traders from competition by insiders and 
hence allows them to recoup their investment in information. 
Mandatory disclosure rules reduce information gathering costs. And 
the ban on fraud and manipulation lowers the cost of verifying data 
for information traders. 
The model presented in this Article enabled us to take positions 
on several important issues in securities regulation. First, we have 
shown that mandatory disclosure is warranted because a competitive 
market of information traders cannot provide all listed corporations 
with adequate incentives for full disclosure. Second, we have 
demonstrated that disclosure duties should apply to soft information 
as well as hard information in order to reduce management agency 
costs. Third, we have established that the fraud-on-the-market 
 
 253. Charmen Loh & R.S. Rathinasamy, Do All Securities Class Actions Have the Same 
Merit? A Stock Market Perspective, 6 REV. PAC. BASIN FIN. MARKETS & POL’Y 167, 167 (2003). 
[An] examination of 290 Rule 10(b)-5 lawsuits . . . yielded two important results. 
First, stocks of the defendant companies, in the aggregate, experience significant 
declines around the time of the first filing of lawsuits. Second, not all cases have the 
same merit, for among the reasons that prompted the filing of class-action litigation, 
only four groups—those that involve accounting irregularities, fraud, making overly 
optimistic statements, and failure to disclose negative news—result in the most 
significant filing-date stock declines. 
Id. 
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presumption is justified not only when markets are efficient, but also 
(and perhaps especially) when markets are inefficient; the 
presumption is necessary to support the information traders, who are 
the most effective price-correcting mechanism. 
